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This dissertation is an evaluation of the concept of a minimum core content to the 
constitutional right to health, with particular reference to HIV-positive persons in 
South Africa. The analysis involves an assessment of what the minimum core entails; 
whether such a formulation is necessary in the South African health context; the 
application of the concept in national and international law; as well as enforcement and 
implementation in the South African context. 
 
An appraisal of the South African social reality reveals the extent of the suffering of 
HIV-positive individuals and the difficulties experienced in accessing health care, 
especially for the vulnerable and disempowered. The problem is exacerbated by a 
critical inadequacy in national jurisprudence which fails to generate certainty in respect 
of the minimum, basic entitlements of affected people.  
 
Such a shortcoming maligns transformative constitutionalism, which requires the 
judiciary to develop a construction of human rights that accords with the canons of the 
Constitution. It is argued that one such course of action is the adoption of the minimum 
core, which prescribes a basic level of human rights that is guaranteed to all people – 
and which may withstand legislative challenge on the basis of resource constraints or 
progressive realisation. 
 
Reference to international law, in terms of Section 39(1) of the Constitution, assists us 
to overcome the shortcoming in domestic legislation in this regard. Of particular 
relevance is covenantal guidance offered by the ICESCR, and its guidelines of 
interpretation, which include the CESCR General Comments and the WHO 
recommendations. 
 
It is postulated that a minimum obligation to HIV-positive individuals under the right 
to health encompasses the duty of treatment and prevention and control in respect of 
the epidemic, on a non-discriminatory basis.  
 
Enforcement and implementation of such core obligations must be strictly and 
timeously effected. Of crucial importance in such a process is a competent judiciary 
that is able to resist an undue deference to the legislature. A review of court judgments, 
however, reveals an inadequate judicial approach to the implementation of socio-
economic rights and an appeal is made to the Constitutional Court to re-commit itself 
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The South African Constitution1 is premised on the recognition of the injustices of the 
past and establishes a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights.2 The Constitution has been hailed as being one of the few 
transformative constitutions in the world3 - the embodiment of human rights and an 
instrument of democratic change. The legal culture of transformative constitutionalism 
engenders the commitment to transform society by creating social and political 
conditions that promote self-determination and human fulfillment.4 This is especially 
important in respect of the constitutional right to access healthcare, and in the context 
of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. Human rights are also essential to addressing a disease 
such as HIV/AIDS that impacts marginalized groups most severely.5 
 
Nearly twenty years later, South Africa is still a nascent democracy plagued by the 
legacy of colonialism, apartheid and patriarchy, which translate into new challenges for 
the state to meet in a society that has come to contend with the tragic consequences of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In addition to the suffering that the epidemic threatens, 
HIV/AIDS triggers the violation of number of constitutional rights of millions HIV-
positive South Africans6, crucially the right to access health care.7 
 
In order for such affected individuals to seek redress and enforcement of the right to 
health, judicial intervention is required and sought, by way of various court 
applications. Such adjudication is thus primary in the enforcement and protection of 
socio-economic rights and requires a competent and progressive judiciary that is strong 
to the task. Critical to the judicial process is the courts’ interpretation of the rights 
entrenched in the Constitution.  
 
                                                
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (referred to as ‘the Constitution’).  
2 The Preamble to the Constitution; S v Makwanyane 1995(3) SA 391 CC; DM Davis and K Klare 
“Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law” 26 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 403 2010. 
3 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 1ed. (2010) 
Juta 25. 
4 Ibid. 
5 L Stemple ‘Health and human rights in today’s fight against HIV/AIDS’ AIDS August 2008 22. 
6 Socio-economic rights are embodied in Sections 24 - Environment, 25 - Property, 26 - Housing & 27 -
Access to health care, food, water and social security, of the 1996 Constitution. 
7 Section 27. Note: In this paper, this right may also be referred to as ‘the right to health’ interchangeably. 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to assess whether the South African experience has 
demonstrated a constitutionally viable and defensible interpretation of socio-economic 
right entitlements, with particular reference to the right to health of HIV-positive 
persons within a human rights framework. Fundamental to this assessment is the issue 
of what exactly is the court interpreting and enforcing? In order to judge the validity of 
the court’s construction of the right to health, and its ensuing entitlements and 
obligations, and in order to properly enforce and implement such entitlements, it is 
imperative that the court defines and prescribes the content thereof. Guidance from 
international legal instruments and foreign case law, which shall be examined, is 
particularly helpful in this regard. In fact, it is a constitutional imperative that same be 
considered by the court in its interpretation of the Constitution.8 However, it is 
submitted that the court has failed to do so and this omission must be addressed in 
order to properly enforce the right in question. 
 
The right to healthcare is of particular importance in a society such as ours, decimated 
by the AIDS pandemic. The South African truth is that the systematic deprivation and 
discrimination that sidelined the majority of our people from accessing basic social 
entitlements during apartheid, still manifest after twenty years of constitutional 
democracy. The sad fact is that, for many, our ‘dark past’ is still a lived reality, 
especially for those living with HIV/AIDS. Poverty, discrimination, sexism, and 
inequality still subvert South Africa today.  
 
It is argued that from a review of the case law that the approach of our courts has not 
been entirely successful in giving definition to our right to health, and certainly not in 
respect of HIV-positive individuals. It is also questionable whether the approach 
currently adopted by the Constitutional Court, that is, one of a reasonableness review, 
is particularly effective in the enforcement of the rights of HIV/AIDS affected 
individuals in the context of the catastrophic suffering and fatalities in the most 
infected country in the world.9 
 
                                                
8 Section 39(1), 1996 Constitution. 
9 UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2012; http://www.unicef.org/esaro/5482_HIV_AIDS.html. 
 
3 
Given the magnitude of the epidemic, the dire socio-economic consequences that result, 
and the constitutional role assigned to the judiciary10 to alleviate the plight of the 
distressed, a jurisprudential strategy is required that endeavours to address the needs of 
millions of HIV-positive individuals, while at the same time respecting resource 
constraints weighing on the state – such that solutions proposed do not defeat the 
underlying purpose of adjudication, rendering it meaningless.   
 
It is also important for the judiciary to be prudent in its approach so as not to trespass 
the constitutional parameters that safeguard the separation of powers of the different 
branches of government. Neither unreasonable interference with, nor undue deference 
to, the policy-making responsibilities of the legislature and executive shall be 
acceptable. 
 
It is submitted that the solution to all the above concerns lies squarely in the 
prescribing of a minimum core content to the right to health11, in respect of HIV-
positive individuals, the interpretation whereof is supplemented by the reasonableness 
review presently advocated by the court. 
 
The essential enquiry is whether there is a minimum core content to the right to health, 
with reference to HIV-positive persons, and what such a concept would involve and 
entail. In order to answer same, it is necessary to conduct an analysis of the 
constitutional and social context of the right, and the conceptual basis underlining it. 
 
The key issues to be addressed in this dissertation are: 
 
(1) Transformative constitutionalism requires transformative judicial adjudication 
 in the interpretation and enforcement of constitutional rights. Has the approach 
 of the courts, thus far, engendered same? 
 
                                                
10 Section 165. 
11 D Bilchitz ‘Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core’ 19 South African Journal of 
Human Rights 1 2003 11; L Forman ‘Ensuring Reasonable Health: Health Rights, the Judiciary and 
South African HIV/AIDS Policy’ 33 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 711 2005 719; Liebenberg 
(see note 3 above) 164. 
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(2) If so, can the court’s approach be improved upon, and if not, how can such a 
 critical shortcoming be remedied? 
 
(3) Does the court prescribe substantive content of the right to health in the 
 interpretation and enforcement of the right? 
 Is there a minimum core content to the right to health for HIV-positive 
 individuals? If not, should there be?  
 
(4) What would such minimum core obligations in respect of HIV-positive 
 individuals include? 
 
(5) How would such minimum core obligations be implemented and enforced in 































The conceptualization of the South African right to health and the notion of a 
minimum core to the right to health for HIV-positive individuals 
 
1.1 Introduction to the constitutional recognition of the right to health in 
 South Africa: 
 
1.1.1 Historical background and HIV/AIDS: 
 
The term HIV is the acronym for the “Human Immunodeficiency Virus,” which causes 
a deterioration of the immune system rendering it unable to fight infection and other 
diseases.12 AIDS is an abbreviation for “Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome” that 
indicates the advanced stages of HIV infection.13 It is associated with the occurrence of 
various opportunistic infections such as pneumonia and tuberculosis (TB) or HIV-
related cancers. HIV is primarily transmitted through unprotected sexual intercourse 
with an infected person. Other means of transmitting the disease include contact with 
infected blood and sharing contaminated syringes are. Infants may contract the virus 
from their mothers during the pregnancy or childbirth, or while breastfeeding.14 
 
For South Africa, colonialism and apartheid meant subjugation and denial, and the 
creation of a healthcare framework that fostered exclusion and inaccess along racial 
and economic lines. The legal system legitimized the disenfranchisement of the black 
majority and institutionalized the privilege of the white minority. South Africa’s 
history with HIV/AIDS has largely followed the same racial and economic lines as our 
social experience has.15 The race-based healthcare system under apartheid was either 
not equipped, or not adequately prioritised to confront the disease. At the beginning of 
our democratic era, the new dispensation inherited the structures of the previous 
                                                
12 http://www.aids.org/topics/aids-faqs/difference-between-hiv-and-aids/; http://www.merriam- 
webster.com/dictionary/hiv. 
13 http://www.aids.org/topics/aids-faqs/what-is-aids-what-causes-aids/; http://www.merriam-  
webster.com/dictionary/aids. 
14 M de Jongh ‘Corporate Social Responsibility as a Tool to Enhance the Fight Against HIV/AIDS’ 5 
Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 94 (2011) 109. 
15 N Brühn ‘Litigating against an Epidemic: HIV/AIDS and the Promise of Socio-economic Rights in 
South Africa’ 17 Michigan Journal of Race & Law 181 2011-2012 186. 
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regime, and this had lent difficulty to the incumbent government’s approach to dealing 
with the disease.  
 
It has been acknowledged that “the epidemic is not just a health problem requiring a 
‘simple’ medical solution.”16 HIV/AIDS is also a social disease, one whose incidence 
is directly related to social and economic factors. As Brühn notes, the somewhat 
“measurable impact of the disease is accompanied by the immeasurable burdens that 
shape the experience of being HIV-positive in South Africa.”17 An effective response 
to the HIV/AIDS epidemic thus, is required to be directed at international and national 
levels, including medicine, epidemiology, infectious disease control, vaccines, and 
social sciences.18 It is submitted that, with the significant medical and scientific 
advancements recorded especially of late,19 it is the social dimensions of the disease 
that demand our focus and attention going forward.20 The socio-economic facet of the 
epidemic unavoidably impacts on the success or failure of any health care strategy, and 
is compounded by various structural determinants, inter alia poverty, discrimination, 
and gender bias. Structural factors are described as “elements outside of individual 
control or knowledge that have the potential to influence the vulnerability of 
individuals and groups to HIV infection, which can include social (e.g. stigma, gender 
inequality), legal-political (e.g. laws and regulations), cultural, and economic (e.g. lack 
of livelihood opportunity) factors.” 21 
 
UNAIDS22 identifies South Africa as being the most HIV infected country in the 
world. The social repercussions of this dubious honour reflect the connection between 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, poverty and the discrimination of infected people, and 
include an alarmingly growing number of orphans and child-headed households; 
                                                
16 H Watchirs ‘A Human Rights Approach to HIV/AIDS: Transforming International Obligations into 
National Laws’ 22 Australian Year Book of International Law 77 2002 82. 
17 Brühn (see note 15 above) 190.  
18 Watchirs (see note 16 above) 83. 
19 S Abdool Karim ‘HIV Infection and Tuberculosis in South Africa: An Urgent Need to Escalate the 
Public Health Response’ Lancet (2009) September 12 374 (9693) 921; S Abdool Karim ‘An AIDS-Free 
Generation’ Science Vol 337 13 July 2012 133; JA Singh ‘Antiretroviral Resource Allocation for HIV 
Prevention’ AIDS (2013) 27 863. 
20 Abdool Karim (see note 19 above) 133; JO Parkhurst ‘HIV Prevention, Structural Change and Social 
Values: The Need for an Explicit Normative Approach’ Journal of the International AIDS Society 2012 
15 (Suppl 1) 17367 1. 
21 http://www.aidstarone.com/focus_areas/prevention/pkb/structural_interventions/overview_structural_  
approaches_hiv_prevention. 
22 UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2012; http://www.unicef.org/esaro/5482_HIV_AIDS.html. 
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exploitation of the vulnerable – children, the weak, elderly and disabled; and the abuse 
of women.23 The debilitating effects of co-epidemics are also evident. For example, it 
is reported that KwaZulu-Natal, which currently has the highest HIV infection rates in 
South Africa,24 also has the highest cases of pneumonia in children under-five years in 
the country; and malnutrition is deemed the most severe in KwaZulu-Natal.25 It is not 
particularly surprising as the province has the lowest expenditure on district health 
management as a percentage of its primary health care budget, of all the provinces. 
 
HIV prevalence and incidence remain high, with five new infections for every two 
people placed on therapy. 26 Acute setbacks in human development are an inevitable 
consequence of untimely death and disability caused by AIDS – the sixth-most 
common cause of death worldwide.27 As it is thus expected, the epidemic makes it 
difficult to achieve programmatic goals for the reduction of poverty and the 
acceleration of progress in other government departments such as education and social 
welfare.28 
 
The cost of HIV/AIDS can be particularly high for individual households. It is a 
disease that targets the young to middle-aged predominantly – the economically viable, 
and breadwinners of the home who are rendered unable to contribute financially. It is 
estimated that within two generations, the average household income in South Africa 
will be a quarter of what it could have been without the impact of AIDS,29 and the 
population 35% less by 2025 due to the epidemic.30 In addition, scarce resources will 
be spent on medicines for those infected with the disease, and the burden of care will 
fall on family members, for whom such a responsibility invariably entails loss of their 
own employment. The result is a vicious cycle of greater poverty and loss, and the 
increased incidence of the disease converging into one another.31 While poverty and 
                                                
23 World Health Organisation Fact Sheet 31 ‘The Right to Health’ 21. 
24 The Mercury, (29 October 2013). ‘HIV Rates Still the Highest in KZN’ 8. 
25 Ibid. 
26 P Pronyk, et al. ‘Policy and Programme Responses for Addressing the Structural Determinants of HIV’ 
June 2013 AIDS Support and Technical Assistance Resources 1. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Brühn (see note 15 above) 189.  
30 de Jongh (see note 14 above) 137. 
31 Brühn (see note 15 above) 189; N Novogrodsky ‘The Duty of Treatment: Human Rights and the 
HIV/AIDS Pandemic’ 12 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 1 2009; J Joni ‘Access To 
Treatment For HIV/AIDS: A Human Rights Issue In The Developing World’ 17 Connecticut Journal of 
 
8 
environmental stresses are chief causes of an unhealthy life; poor health may in turn, 
be one of the reasons for poverty and underdevelopment.32 
 
The social cost of HIV/AIDS inescapably impacts on the South African healthcare 
system which is unable to cope with the strain of the consequences of the disease – loss 
of healthcare workers; the death of patients; and the high cost of healthcare. It erodes 
government’s ability to maintain essential services,33 and further diminishes rights 
access. 
 
It has been acknowledged that the relationship between HIV/AIDS and human rights 
has developed in response to the epidemic, not just in South Africa, but in all 
developing countries. 34 And it is here that the potential to overcome the tragic situation 
presents itself – by recognising that the way forward lies at the intersection of AIDS 
and human rights. The answer lies in access to medicines and health care for people 
living with HIV/AIDS – where, as previous successful campaigns have shown, 
treatment of infected and affected individuals can expand the implementation of 
economic and social rights; and the recognition of rights in turn, enables treatment of 
and care for people living with HIV/AIDS. 35  It is also about re-affirming the 
individual’s rights to human dignity, equality and freedom,36 which increased access to 
HIV medicines can assure. 
 
The Constitution, to this end, recognises that the health and well-being of an individual 
is determined by various factors – medical, environmental and societal, by entrenching 
various “socio-economic rights” in the Bill of Rights.37 Section 27 of the Constitution, 
in particular provides for the right of everyone to access health care, food, water and 
social security. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
International Law 273 2001-2002 275. 
32 IR Pavone ‘The HIV/AIDS Pandemic and International and Human Rights Law’ 2009 Lawasia 
Journal 96 2009 97. 
33 Brühn (see note 15 above) 183. 
34 Novogrodsky (see note 31 above) 7. 
35 WHO Fact Sheet 31 (see note 23 above) 20; Joni (see note 31 above). 
36 Section 7(1), 1996 Constitution.  
37 See constitutional socio-economic rights at note 6 above.  
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1.1.2 The constitutional recognition of socio-economic rights, such as the right 
 to access health care: 
 
1.1.2.1 The justiciability of socio-economic rights: 
 
In order to properly understand the rights accorded to HIV-positive individuals, it is 
important to make reference to the constitutional framework of socio-economic rights 
that impact on the well-being of such persons.  
 
The late Dullah Omar, the esteemed former Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, said on the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution, that 
“the failure to do so would not only make social and economic transformation 
impossible, but in reality, it would be nullifying first generation rights, inter alia, 
equality and democracy for the vast majority of South Africans.” 38  He further 
identified two major objectives that a future constitutional framework for South Africa 
should promote – firstly, it should not prevent social and economic transformation; and 
secondly, it must create mechanisms and structures that will empower South Africans 
to achieve and defend such rights through the Constitution.39 It is submitted that it is in 
the context of HIV/AIDS, perhaps, that the prophetic value of the aforementioned 
objectives may be seen most clearly.  
 
(i) The Certification process: 
 
The inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution thus proved essential to the 
promotion of such progressive constitutional aims. The Constitutional certification 
process40, however, demonstrated the divergence of views regarding such inclusion, 
and to an extent, reflects the current ambivalence in the judicial enforcement of such 
rights.41  
 
                                                
38 D Omar ‘Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights’ in A Bill of Rights for a Democratic South 
Africa (1991) 106-114. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
41 DM Davis ‘Adjudicating the Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards 
'Deference Lite'?’ 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 301 2006 303. 
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Proponents of inclusion argued that the constitutional presence of socio-economic 
rights was fundamental to social transformation (as envisaged by Omar above), as it 
gave a voice and a platform to the poor and the marginalised of society – purely by 
virtue of their entitlement to a better life guaranteed in the Constitution. It would serve 
as a mechanism of rights enforcement and state accountability in the event of rights 
deprivation.42 Pieterse 43 perceives justiciable socio-economic rights as “tools with 
which to bridge the disconnection” between the ideal of social justice espoused by 
socio-economic rights contained in the Constitution and the lived experiences of South 
Africans. Ultimately, it is a means of redressing the legacy of apartheid while securing 
the democratic path forward. 
 
(ii) The Separation of Powers doctrine: 
 
The arguments advanced by opponents to the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution are echoed in the judgments delivered in the post-constitutional 
adjudication of socio-economic rights cases – predominantly that the enforcement of 
these rights would be inconsistent with the doctrine of the separation of powers, which 
seeks to keep distinct the roles of the judiciary, the legislature and the executive. The 
concern was primarily founded on the belief that the judiciary may trespass on the 
territory, and interfere with the duties of the legislature and executive, by directing how 
policy should be framed, by issuing directives as to how the legislature is to act, and 
how state budgets should be allocated.44 The separation of powers doctrine instead sees 
the legislature and executive as best placed to pronounce on how socio-economic 
rights entitlements may most effectively be claimed and enforced – this in light of 
purported legislative capacity and proficiency, and resources at its disposal in this 
regard.45 
 
The certification process acknowledged that the judiciary may pronounce on socio-
economic matters with budgetary implications, but recognised that this was also true in 
                                                
42 Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 18. 
43 M Pieterse ‘Legislative and Executive Translation’ 14 Law Democracy & Development 231 2010. 
44 M Pieterse ‘Coming To Terms With Judicial Enforcement Of Socio-Economic Rights’ 20 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 383 2004; C Mubangizi ‘The Constitutional Protection of Socio-
Economic Rights’ 2 African Journal of Legal Studies 1 2006-200; Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 20; 
Davis (see note 41 above) 304. 
45 Pieterse (see note 43 above) 232. 
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the adjudication of civil-political rights, which carried no censure in respect of a breach 
of the separation of powers.46  The Constitutional Court thus confirmed the place of 
socio-economic rights in the Constitution, as well as the justiciability of such rights.47 
It also recognised the interdependence of all rights,48 which are co-existent and require 
a purposive interpretation that gives credence to the founding values and aims of the 
Constitution in a democratic dispensation. As such, in the judicial enforcement of 
socio-economic rights, the tenets of the Constitution must be applied holistically and in 
the context of the South African reality.  
 
 1.1.2.2 Transformative constitutionalism and adjudication: 
 
As a society safeguarded by the Constitution, the goal, inter alia, is to “heal the 
divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights,” as well as to “improve the quality of life of all citizens 
and free the potential of each person.”49 In this context, the judicial enforcement of 
human rights must occur within the constitutional mandate, as provided for in the 
Preamble.  In essence, what is envisaged is an endeavour in transformative 
constitutionalism that engenders social change for the benefit of all South Africans. 
 
Karl Klare 50  defines transformative constitutionalism as a “long-term project of 
constitutional enactment, interpretation and enforcement, committed to transforming a 
country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, 
participatory and egalitarian direction.” It is submitted that this is especially important 
in respect of the constitutional right to access healthcare, and in the context of 
HIV/AIDS in South Africa.  
 
If we are to address individual and public inequities that inhere as a result of the 
epidemic, it is vital to recognise the importance of socio-economic rights, such as the 
right to access health care, and the significance of transformative constitutionalism in 
our social context.  
                                                
46 The Certification case (see note 40 above) at paragraph 77. 
47 Ibid at paragraph 78. 
48 Ibid at paragraph 37. 
49 Preamble, 1996 Constitution. 
50 K Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ 14 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 146 (1998) 150. 
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By requiring an openness to recognising and responding to both existing and new 
forms of disadvantage and marginalization51 that have emerged in post-apartheid South 
Africa, including the AIDS epidemic,52 transformative constitutionalism provides the 
means to address the social dimension of the disease53 - underdevelopment, inequality 
and poverty – by foregrounding these issues in judicial decisions.  
 
It is submitted that the inclusion in the Constitution, and justiciability of, socio-
economic rights ought to be exploited to ensure that the rights of HIV-positive 
individuals to health care are realised beneficially, and not relegated to the status of 
“background norms”.54 In holding that socio-economic rights are subject to judicial 
enforcement,55 the Constitutional Court significantly ensured that the transformation of 
the lives of many South Africans was a legal possibility.  
 
The central role of the judiciary in such an interpretive process is apparent. Courts 
must support the development of substantive judicial standards that give meaning to 
such rights and entitlements, and serve, as such, as vital mechanisms of transformative 
adjudication that advance the tenets of transformative constitutionalism. 56 
Transformative adjudication involves facilitating democratic transformation via a 
forum at which the State response to poverty, especially, can be evaluated in terms of 
constitutional values.  
 
The role of such public interest litigation in advancing transformative constitutionalism 
is critical. Gloppen57 suggests that various factors determine the relative success of 
such action – 
• marginalized groups must be placed to effectively “voice” their claims or have 
representatives argue on their behalf; 
                                                
51 P Langa ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’  (2006) 17 (3) Stellenbosch Law Review 351 354. 
52 Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 28. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Pieterse (see note 43 above) 232. 
55 Certification case (see note 40 above) at paragraph 78. 
56  It is suggested that one such mechanism is the recognition of a minimum core content to socio-
economic rights, particularly in respect of Section 27, as discussed further below. 
57 S Gloppen ‘Social Rights Litigation as Transformation: South African Perspectives’ Bergen: Chr. 




• the effective and meaningful “responsiveness of the court” to respond to such 
claims; 
• “judicial capability” to enforce rights significantly and effectually; and 
• eventual “compliance” with judgments by the executive and legislature by way 
of legislation and policy. 
 
1.2 Defining the “right to access health care” for South Africans in the 
 context of transformative constitutionalism: 
 
1.2.1 Giving definition and content to the right to health: 
 
The preamble of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) constitution defines health 
as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease and infirmity.”58 The United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (UN-CESCR) has defined the right to health in Article 12 
(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),59 as “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.” It has been suggested that the definition given 
in Article 12 (1) of the ICESCR is more reasonable and less ambitious than that of the 
WHO,60 taking into account difficulties that may arise in the realisation of the right. 
 
The “right to health care,” on the other hand, can specifically be defined as “the 
prevention, treatment and management of illness and the preservation of mental and 
physical well-being through the services offered by the medical and allied health 
professions.”61 People are entitled to freely control their health and have the right to a 
health care system that provides the opportunity equally for everyone to attain the 
highest attainable standard of health. 
 
The constitutional right to the right to health care62 is located at Section 27 of the 
                                                
58 Constitution of the World Health Organization. Geneva: World Health Organization; 1948.  
59 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966. 
60 de Jongh (see note 14 above) 94. 
61 Mubangizi, JC (2010) ‘The Right to Health Care in the Specific Context of Access to HIV/AIDS 
Medicines: What can South Africa and Uganda Learn from Each Other?’ 10 African Human Rights Law 
Journal 105 2010 109 
62 Section 27 of the Constitution provides: 
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Constitution, and as with other constitutional socio-economic rights, may be said to 
have been molded in terms of the ICESCR.63 It provides for “the right to have access to 
health care services.”  
 
The divergence of definition, or perhaps, wide contortions of what “health” and “health 
care” actually mean, as well as the social dimension of the concept, demonstrate that 
the right to (access) health or health care is a broad notion that entails an 
interdependency of all human rights64 – it is closely related to the right to food and 
water, and housing, for example. In itself, it involves a range of rights that rely on 
socio-economic factors necessary in order to promote a healthy life, in addition to the 
factors that ensure good physical and medical health. 
 
Transformative constitutionalism and adjudication mandate the judiciary with the task 
of interpreting and giving meaning to constitutional rights and entitlements, 65 
developing the law to make it more socially relevant and responsive, and to provide a 
forum at which State action may be measured in terms of the Constitution. The judicial 
impact of such judgments must of necessity, be far-reaching, persuasive and influential, 
empowering indigent and vulnerable claimants who face difficulties accessing the law 
in the first place.66 This is further underscored by the requirements of Section 39 (1) of 
the Constitution which requires the courts to develop an interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights which promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom.  
 
The court’s approach in Government of the RSA and others v Grootboom and others 
(“Grootboom”),67 demonstrates that consideration of both the context of the rights (the 
Constitution) and the circumstances in which the violation of the rights is alleged (the 
                                                                                                                                        
1.  Everyone has the right to have access to - 
 (a) health care services, including reproductive health care; sufficient food and water; and 
 (b)  social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, 
 appropriate social assistance.  
2.  The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of each of these rights.  
3.   No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. 
63 K.McLean ‘Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa’ (2009) 
Pretoria University Law Press 15; available at: http://www.pulp.up.ac.za/pdf/2009_13/2009_13.pdf. 
64 De Jongh (see note 14 above) 96 
65 Section 172 
66 Gloppen (see note 57 above) 7 
67 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).  
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political, historical, economic and social context), is required. 68  Transformative 
adjudication thus implies a willingness to explore new approaches to the interpretation 
of rights that promote the values of human dignity, equality and freedom, and an 
inclination to adopt novel interpretive methods. Such openness implies consideration 
of International and foreign jurisprudence on socio-economic rights as well.  
 
In light of the diversity of people of various socio-economic dispositions that rely on 
the right, the importance of prescribing more than just a definition but actual 
substantive content to the right to health thus becomes apparent. This is especially so 
for HIV-positive individuals, against a background of abject poverty and the stark 
deprivation of basic human needs; and in light of a need for valid enforcement 
mechanisms ensuring that basic needs, at a minimum, are guaranteed. This accords 
with the suggestion by Henry Shue that human rights concern the “lower limits on 
tolerable human conduct” rather than “great aspirations and exalted ideals.”69 Human 
rights are therefore basic standards that are more intent on “avoiding the terrible than 
with achieving the best.”70 The aim is to provide a minimum good for a maximum 
number, if not all, of the people.71 
 
It is submitted that in this context, ascribing minimum core obligations to human rights 
play a valuable role in socio-economic rights litigation, achieving that modest standard 
for the majority of people, and ensuring that the urgent material needs of vulnerable 
and disadvantaged groups receive immediate attention. 72  Failure to do so risks 
betraying the hope promised by the Constitution. 
 
1.2.2 A minimum core content to the Constitutional right to health: 
 
Young defines the concept of a minimum core as “a minimalist strategy whereby 
maximum gains are made by minimizing goals”,73 in that “the minimum core standard 
                                                
68 Ibid at paragraph 22. 
69 Henry Shue ‘Basic Rights’ 2 ed. Princeton University Press (1980) 74. 
70 Ibid. 
71 J. Nickel ‘Making Sense of Human Rights’ 2 ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2007. 
72 Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 172. 
73 KG Young ‘The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in search of Content’ 




seeks to confer a minimum, predetermined legal content to economic and social 
rights.”74 It is submitted that the transformative adjudication of a socio-economic rights 
dispute necessitates invoking such a concept; and entails a process whereby courts give 
specified content to these rights, which are usually outlined very vaguely.75 In this 
way, it is believed that the executive is placed with a greater understanding of what 
obligations arise from the right in question, and the individual is placed in a better 
position to be able to hold the executive responsible for not meeting the guaranteed 
minimum of that right.  
 
1.2.2.1 The development of a ‘minimum core’ concept: 
 
(i) The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the ICESCR, 1987 
 (“the Limburg Principles”): 
 
The Limburg Principles76 were formulated when international law experts met in 
Maastricht in June 1986 to consider the nature and scope of the obligations of States 
Parties to the ICESCR.77 The principles proposed, in respect of a minimum level of 
obligation, that State Parties be obligated to ensure respect for minimum subsistence 
rights for all regardless of their level of economic development.78 
 
(ii) The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
 Cultural Rights, 1997 (“the Maastricht Guidelines”): 
 
The Maastricht Guidelines79 were adopted in Maastricht in January 1997, to elaborate 
on the Limburg Principles as regards the nature and scope of violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights and appropriate responses and remedies.80 The Guidelines 
                                                
74 Ibid. 
75 J Chowdhury  ‘Judicial Adherence to a Minimum Core Approach to Socio-Economic Rights – A 
Comparative Perspective’ (2009) Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference 
Papers, Paper 27 2. 
76 UN Commission on Human Rights, Note verbale dated 86/12/05 from the Permanent Mission of the 
Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Centre for Human Rights 
("Limburg Principles"), 8 January 1987. 
77 http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/file?uuid=de124f6f-3388. 
78 Limburg Principles at paragraphs 25-28. 
79 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 




expand on the Limburg Principles on a minimum obligation, stating that failures to 
satisfy minimum core obligations violate the ICESCR and that States had such 
obligations irrespective of the national availability of resources or other factors or 
difficulties.81 
 
1.2.2.2 A conceptual basis for the minimum core: 
 
Conceptually, the “minimum core” is said to be derived from German Basic Law82,
  
where the “‘core’ or ‘essential content’ of certain constitutional rights may not be 
limited or violated”.83
 
Bilchitz notes that the core suggests that “there are different 
levels to the realisation of a right, some of which are more ‘essential than others’.” 84 It 
thereby confers a minimum legal content for socio-economic rights – “a basic floor of 
social provisioning”. 85 It is argued that the core protects people’s urgent interests in 
survival, 86 as “the inability to survive wipes out all possibility for realising the source 
values of a being.”87  
 
 
1.2.2.3 Defining the content of the ‘minimum core’ to the right to health: 
 
As will be elaborated on in Chapter 3 below,88 General Comments 3 and 14 of the UN-
CESCR to the ICESCR, provide specific definition to the concept of a minimum core. 
Paragraph 10 of UN-CESCR General Comment 389 provides that “a minimum core 
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of 
                                                
81 Maastricht Guidelines at paragraph 9. 
82 Young (see note 73 above) 124. 
83 Ibid. 
84 D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic 
Rights 1 ed. (2007) Oxford University Press 186. 
85 S Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-Economic Rights: An Effective Tool in 
Challenging Poverty’ (2002) 6 LDD 159: 169, available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/LDD/2002/2.pdf; 
D Petherbridge ‘South Africa’s Pending Ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: What are the implications?’ (2012) 2, available at: 
http://blogs.sun.ac.za/seraj/files/2012/11/South-Africas-pending-ratification-of-the-ICESCR.pdf. 
86 Bilchitz (see note 84 above) 187. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Space constraints and context preclude a more detailed account of the CESCR General Comments 
beyond that which is discussed in this Chapter 1. In Chapter 3, a detailed application of these Comments 
is made to the right to health.    
89 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 3: The 
Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), 14 December 1990. 
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each of the rights (in the ICESCR) is incumbent upon every State party … (and that) a 
State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential 
foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most 
basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the 
Covenant”. 
 
UN-CESCR General Comment 14 90  serves as the definitive instrument guiding 
interpretation of a minimum core to the right to health, which it locates at paragraph 
43,91 and further obligations of comparable priority in paragraph 44.92 It is submitted 
that these provisions provide the guidance necessary in the assessment of the basic 
rights of HIV-positive individuals, or the ‘floor of social provisioning’93 below which a 
State may not legitimately permit the deprivation of rights. Of particular relevance are 
the obligations to: 
“(a) To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis, 
especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups; 
(d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on 
Essential Drugs; 
(e)  To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services” (at paragraph 43), 
and 
“(c) To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases” (at paragraph 44). 
 
 
1.2.2.4 The minimum core controversy: 
                                                
90 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 14: The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), 11 August 2000. 
91 In the Committee’s view, these core obligations include at least the following obligations – 
(a) To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a non- discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable 
or marginalized groups; 
(b) To ensure access to the minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from        
hunger to everyone; 
(c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable water; 
(d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs; 
(e)  To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services;  
(f) To adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of action, on the basis of epidemiological evidence, 
addressing the health concerns of the whole population; the strategy and plan of action shall be devised, and periodically reviewed, 
on the basis of a participatory and transparent process; they shall include methods, such as right to health indicators and 
benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored; the process by which the strategy and plan of action are devised, as well 
as their content, shall give particular attention to all vulnerable or marginalized groups. 
92  The Committee considers the following obligations to be of comparable priority –  
(a) To ensure reproductive, maternal (pre-natal as well as post-natal) and child health care; 
(b) To provide immunization against the major infectious diseases occurring in the community; 
(c) To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases; 
(d) To provide education and access to information concerning the main health problems in the community, including methods of 
preventing and controlling them; 
(e) To provide appropriate training for health personnel, including education on health and human rights. 




The concept is by no means free of controversy, and does give rise to conceptual 
complexities with courts differing in their approach and academics in disagreement in 
respect of clarifying the concrete content of entitlements of rights.94 Lehmann95 is of 
the view that the advocated minimum core approach is “both conceptually and 
pragmatically misconceived”, and considers the court's reasonableness approach 
jurisprudentially sounder than the proposed minimum core alternative. The basis for 
her argument is that the process of according a minimum core to human rights is 
“utilitarian rather than principled”, which renders the minimum core approach 
inappropriate in the context of human rights enforcement. 96 She contends that the 
judicial focus should rather be on addressing any purported squandering of public 
funds, so that funds are spent appropriately on the public good.97 
 
In addition to the debate relating to the separation of powers, discussed above, 
concerns also arise in respect of the counter-majoritarianism argument. This condemns 
the role of the judiciary, who are unelected individuals, in mandating the executive, 
who are democratically elected by the majority of the electorate, in matters concerning 
such a majority. Such an act is considered undemocratic and arbitrary. Further unease 
exists in respect of the capacity of the judiciary, both in terms of competence and 
faculty.  
 
It is however, submitted that it is by virtue of the relative independence of the judiciary, 
that the checks and balances intended by the separation of powers doctrine can be 
implemented. It is suggested that the judicial role is not to impede or replace legislative 
function, but rather to monitor same. This is essential for a democracy and the meeting 
of constitutional guarantees.  
 
It is arguable that without meeting the minimum essential needs which people require 
to survive, the state’s obligation to progressively achieve the full realisation of the 
                                                
94 M Pieterse ‘Resuscitating Socio-economic Rights: Constitutional Entitlements to Health Care 
Services’ 22 South African Journal of Human Rights 473 2006; K Lehmann ‘In defence of the 
Constitutional Court: Litigating Socio-Economic Rights and the Myth of the Minimum Core’ 22 
American University International Law Review 163 (2006-2007); Young (see note 73 above). 
95 Lehmann (see note 94 above) 165. 
96 Ibid 166. 
97 Ibid 165. 
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rights become meaningless.  
 
According to Forman,98 the minimum core “reflects the fundamental human rights idea 
that certain individual interests, including the basic health needs of the poor, should be 
prioritised at any cost.” Further, that the core suggests that social rights, and the 
interests they reflect, “should place reasonable limits on political and economic actions 
that intrude so far into basic needs as to render human dignity and equal worth 
meaningless.”99 
 
The ‘core’ requires that States should provide the basics of a functional public health 
and health care system, including essential drugs, hospitals, clinics, and personnel.100 
The core is not defined in terms of specific health care services, but rather provides 
guidelines for policy-making. As such, content may vary from country to country, but 
its normative content is to protect the right from resource constraints that render it 
empty and meaningless. It is said, “the core is intended to ensure that States prioritise 
the maximum decencies of citizenship in the modern world.”101  
 
 
1.2.2.5 Minimum core obligations in the context of uBuntu advance 
 transformative constitutionalism: 
 
1.2.2.5.1 The Constitutional value of uBuntu: 
 
The minimum core primarily seeks to provide a basic blueprint of the needs of a people 
in particular circumstances that allow the dignity of such individuals to be maintained 
– whether such dignity manifests in ensuring such people’s survival or basic 
necessities of life. It accords in either way with the concept of being human.  
 
                                                
98 L Forman ‘What Future for the Minimum Core? Contextualizing the Implications of South African 
Socioeconomic Rights Jurisprudence for the International Human Right to Health,’ in J Harrington and 
M Stuttaford (eds), Global Health and Human Rights: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives Routledge 
2009 62. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Forman (see note 98 above) 69. 
101 A Sachs ‘The Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights – The Grootboom case’ 2006 56 
Current Legal Problems 579. 
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Given the emphasis placed on the constitutional values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom, as well as the importance of transformative constitutionalism and 
adjudication in the meeting of constitutional guarantees, it is worth exploring the 
relationship that may exist between the minimum core and the constitutional value of 
uBuntu. 
 
The South African Constitutional Court has advanced that constitutional values 
contained in the Constitution do not constitute a numerus clausus, and that other values 
can also be elevated to this status. uBuntu, or group or shared solidarity, has been 
recognised by the Constitutional Court as such a constitutional value.102 The shared 
struggle of a people, first linked by oppression and thereafter by a rampant epidemic, 
provides the basis for such a value to inform our jurisprudence.  
 
In S v Makwanyane, uBuntu was described as follows – 
“It is a culture which places some emphasis on communality and on the interdependence of the members 
of a community. It recognises a person's status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, 
dignity, value and acceptance from the members of the community such person happens to be part of. It 
also entails the converse, however. The person has a corresponding duty to give the same respect, 
dignity, value and acceptance to each member of that community. More importantly, it regulates the 
exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of 
rights by all” 
 
Mokgoro J further elaborated that – 
 “Generally, uBuntu translates as ‘humanness’. In its most fundamental sense it translates as personhood 
and “morality”. Metaphorically, it expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the 
significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central to the survival of communities. While it 
envelops the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to the basic 
norms and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and morality. Its spirit 
emphasises respect for human dignity, marking a shift from confrontation to conciliation. In South 
Africa uBuntu has become a notion with particular resonance in the building of a democracy”.103 
 
This concept has also been alluded to in the White Paper for Social Welfare104 as a 
value permeating the social security context as well,105 that – 
                                                
102 S v Makwanyane (see note 2 above) at paragraph 224. 
103 S v Makwanyane (see note 2 above) at paragraph 308. 
104 The White Paper for Social Welfare (GN 1108 in GG 18166 of 8 August 1997). 
105 Ibid Chapter 2, paragraph 24. 
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“the principle for caring for each other's well-being will be promoted, and a spirit of mutual support 
fostered. Each individual's humanity is ideally expressed through his or her relationship with others and 
theirs in turn through a recognition of the individual's humanity. uBuntu means that people are people 
through other people”. 
 
In, City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Limited and Others106 (“City of 
Johannesburg”), Jajbhay J held that “our Constitution requires a court to weave the 
elements of humanity and compassion within the fabric of the formal structures of the 
law. It calls upon us to balance competing interests in a principled way and to promote 
the constitutional vision of a caring society based on good neighbourliness and shared 
concern (referring to Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers107(“Port 
Elizabeth Municipality”) at paragraph 37). Our Constitution retains from the past only 
what is defensible and represents a decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of that 
part of the past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular and repressive, and 
vigorous identification of and commitment to a democratic, universalistic, caring and 
aspirationally egalitarian ethos (referring to Mahomed J in Makwanyane).” 
 
The crucial importance of this approach by the court is evident. It translates into an 
obligation on the State to mobilise sufficient social resources towards overcoming 
poverty and extreme inequalities. It follows that the respect for and promotion of the 
principle of uBuntu can in fact contribute to the success of a comprehensive human 
rights system and other measures aimed at the alleviation of poverty and social 
exclusion in South Africa. To this end, it can enable the realisation of health rights, 
especially for HIV-positive individuals, by the recognition of human worth. 
 
1.2.2.5.2 The minimum core, uBuntu and HIV-positive individuals: 
 
(i) uBuntu and Transformative Constitutionalism: 
 
Thomas is of the opinion that there are two important factors in transformative 
constitutionalism – “a constitution that recognises social and economic rights, and a 
                                                
106 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Limited and Others 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) at 
paragraph 62. 
107 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
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reformed courts system.” 108   He considers the concept of uBuntu a jurisprudential 
principle that ought to be informing courts in such a process, 109 to enable a value-
based recognition of rights – especially in light of our social context and history.  
 
A minimum core content to the right to health, it has been said, would encompass the 
constitutional value of human dignity. As highlighted in the Minister of Health & 
Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others (‘TAC’) case “the minimum core 
might not be easy to define, but includes at least the minimum decencies of life 
consistent with human dignity.”110 In this vein, by ensuring that the basic essential 
levels of existence are secured so as to guarantee the survival of a people – and in so 
doing, maintaining human dignity – the minimum core resonates with the tenets of 
uBuntu. 
 
Himonga111 argues for the importance of the concept of uBuntu in the implementation 
of human rights, as a response to the challenges presented in rights enforcement in 
Africa – mainly an apparent lack of lawfulness and acceptance of such rights among 
the people who are supposed to benefit from them.  An inherent fear of Anglophone 
influences festers among indigenous people, who are suspicious of foreign support – 
for example, in the form of medical aid.  While such an outlook might be expected, 
given colonial coercion and abuse, it may be detrimental to those in need of treatment 
provided by such powers. uBuntu serves to bridge this gap, and enable a communal 
acceptance of assistance. 
 
(ii) uBuntu and the African Charter: 
 
In light of the Preamble to the African Charter, which sets out the concept of “duty and 
people’s rights,” the Charter’s provisions on the right to health may be said to be 
directly related to uBuntu, and the realisation of the right. For example, attributes of 
                                                
108 CG Thomas ‘Ubuntu. The missing link in the rights discourse in post-apartheid transformation in 
South Africa’ International Journal of African Renaissance Studies 3:2 39: 40. 
109 Ibid. 
110  Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others (No.2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 
at paragraph 28. 
111 C Himonga ‘The Right to Health in an African Cultural Context: The Role of Ubuntu in the 
Realisation of the Right to Health with Special Reference to South Africa’ Journal of African Law First 
View article August 2013 1. 
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uBuntu such as communitarianism, interdependence and group-solidarity are 
particularly relevant for the purposes of effective HIV prevention and treatment 
campaigns. According to Mutua,112 “solidarity between the individual and the greater 
society safeguards collective rights, without which individual rights would be 
unattainable.” It is further held that by giving duties to individuals, the Charter 
emphasises the central feature of uBuntu, which is “group-centred individualism.” 
 
(iii) uBuntu and the ICESCR: 
 
uBuntu is further in line with the provisions of General Comment 14 to the ICESCR, 
which holds that the realisation of the right to health is open to various approaches – 
including policy and judicial action. This would allow social action, which may be 
more effective. It has been said that the TAC case “exemplifies how uBuntu’s attribute 
of solidarity may play a role in the enforcement of court decisions on health rights.”113 
 
(iv) uBuntu and Children’s rights: 
 
uBuntu is also seen as especially relevant in respect of AIDS-orphans “for such 
children are heavily dependent on society for their very survival.”114 The high number 
of abandoned and AIDS-infected children in South Africa bears testament to the failure 
of the social welfare system to adequately protect and support such children. Many 
children, especially orphans, street children and children in child-headed households 
are often simply treated as statistics – ignored by the government. It is submitted that 
this represents the real tragedy of the HIV/AIDS epidemic – the death of the country’s 
future.  It has been proposed that the Constitutional Court enforce minimum core 
entitlements for such children without support. 115   This would help ensure the 
protection of orphans and other vulnerable children - and would be consistent with 
children’s constitutional rights as well as the overarching philosophy of uBuntu. 
 
                                                
112 M wa Mutua ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint’ (1994) 35 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 339. 
113 Himonga (see note 111 above) 25. 
114 JD Bessler ‘In the Spirit of Ubuntu: Enforcing the Rights of Orphans and Vulnerable Children 





1.2.2.6  Concluding thoughts: 
 
Following on the reasoning of Sachs J in Port Elizabeth Municipality, that “in all 
determinations about the reach of constitutionally protected rights, the starting and 
ending point of the analysis must be to affirm the values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom,”116 uBuntu would influence the reach of the right to health from a 
communitarian perspective117 as it is profoundly based on the concept of humanity and 
respect for one another. uBuntu requires focus on the human dimension of judgments, 
rather than just on the position of the State and the financial. This, it is submitted, may 
prove more beneficial for a large number of people in the enforcement of core 
obligations, especially in the South African social context.  
 
The value of prescribing a minimum core content to the right to health in respect of 
HIV-positive individuals is thus evident on various levels. Firstly, the core is seen to 
guarantee such individuals minimum levels of healthcare that are immediately 
realizable.  Such a guarantee has the potential of saving thousands of lives, and 
preserving many more. Further, the core would help ensure that the dignity of the sick 
and debilitated is maintained. In essence, the core advances the tenets of transformative 
constitutionalism, and constitutional values such as uBuntu, primarily meeting the 













                                                
116 Port Elizabeth Municipality (see note 107 above) at paragraph 15. 





Prescribing a minimum core content to the right to health – does National and 




It is submitted that the effective transformative adjudication of socio-economic rights, 
such as the right to health care, would be invalidated if the realisation of the right does 
not successfully reach the indigent and make a difference to their lives. Accordingly, 
transformative adjudication requires constitutionally defensible judgments, enforcing 
and effectively realising the constitutional guarantee at stake. As such, the court’s use 
of definitive standards and tests in the interpretation of rights impacts acutely on the 
realisation of entitlements. 118  Judgments must resist opposition and satisfy the 
requirements of transparency and accountability. Chowdhury makes a valid 
observation that “if courts wish to meaningfully adjudicate socio-economic rights, then 




2.2 The South African law governing the right to health:  
 
2.2.1 The Constitution - Section 27: 
   
The South African Bill of Rights is believed to be among “the most progressive in the 
world.”120 It locates the right to access health care at Section 27 of the Constitution, 
which provides that everyone has the right to have access to health care services;121 
that the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of the right;122 and that no one may be 
                                                
118 Chowdhury (see note 75 above) 2. 
119 Ibid 18. 
120 JC Mubangizi ‘HIV/AIDS and the South African Bill of Rights, with Specific Reference to the 
Approach and Role of the Courts’ African Journal of AIDS Research (2004) 3 (2) 113: 115. 
121 Section 27(1). 
122 Section 27(2). 
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refused emergency medical treatment.123 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 above, the constitutional right to health must be appreciated 
and interpreted in terms of its social context124 – the legacy of apartheid and an 
inequitable and discriminatory health system. The situation of the right to health 
amongst the socio-economic determinants of health in Section 27 facilitates 
transformative constitutionalism by laying the foundation for an interpretation that 
attempts to redress the gross inequalities of the past and establish an egalitarian health 
care system.  
 
Despite the transformative potential of the right, considerable difficulty lies in the 
implementation of the right. There is very little to indicate what the scope and nature of 
the entitlement is, or the extent to which resource limitations and progressive 
realisation may permissibly limit this right to ‘access health care services.’  
 
2.2.2 Case Law: 
 
Transformative adjudication is intended to advance and give meaning to constitutional 
principles in the spirit that the Constitution intends.125 In this way, one should be able 
to rely on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court to provide the interpretation 
sought and to give the content required to legislative provisions. It would be instructive 
at this juncture to consider current South African jurisprudence, with particular 
reference to the approach adopted by the court in socio-economic rights litigation, as 
well as any recognition by the courts of a minimum core content to the right at issue. 
The following analysis assesses the prevailing position of the courts. A further critique 
of the Constitutional Court’s approach - the suitability thereof, and whether an 
amended approach is required, follows at Chapter 4 below. 
 
2.2.2.1 Judicial use of the reasonableness standard of review: 
 
                                                
123 Section 27(3). 
124 Grootboom (see note 67 above) at paragraph 22. 
125 Preamble, 1996 Constitution. 
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The Constitutional Court has had opportunities to assess the content of various socio-
economic rights, with litigation primarily in respect of the right to emergency medical 
treatment health care,126 access to health care,127 and social assistance in Section 27,128 
the right to access housing in Section 26,129 and the right to access water in Section 
25130 - and has revealed the court’s adoption of the reasonableness paradigm as its 
preferred model of review for assessing compliance with the Constitution. The court 
has, in fact, been unwavering in its refusal to adopt a minimum core content to the 
rights at issue, and to develop the substantive content thereof. This has been attributed 
to the Constitutional Court’s wariness to be seen as trespassing on the duties of another 
branch of government, should it draw on issues of policy-making in its judgments or 
make decisions that have budgetary implications for the polity. 
 
In an effort to retain a separation in duties and constitutional propriety, the court has 
advanced the reasonableness standard of review in respect of State action. The central 
question that the court asks is whether the means chosen are reasonably capable of 
facilitating the realisation of the socio-economic right in question. 
 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu Natal (‘Soobramoney’)131 involved a 
determination in respect of treatment being made available at a public hospital, to a 
patient in the final stages of chronic renal failure. The patient was also a diabetic, and 
suffered from ischaemic heart disease and cerebro-vascular disease. Dialysis treatment 
would have prolonged the patient’s life indeterminately, with no hope for a cure. 
Further such treatment was costly and weighed heavily on the already over-burdened 
institution. Faced with such serious resource constraints, and difficult decisions to 
make prioritising which patients to admit, the institution devised and followed a strict 
admission policy. In respect of dialysis patients, in particular, admission was limited to 
patients who faced a reasonable prospect of being cured in a short-term, and who were 
eligible for a kidney transplant. The applicant, Soobramoney, did not qualify.  
 
Soobramoney applied to the Durban High Court claiming a right to receive dialysis 
                                                
126 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
127 Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others (No.2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
128 Khosa & Others v Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC).  
129 Grootboom (see note 67 above). 
130 Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
131 Soobramoney (see note 126 above). 
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treatment, in terms of the constitutional right to life132 and the right to receive 
emergency medial treatment.133 The High Court dismissed the application. 
 
On appeal, the Constitutional Court defined ‘emergency’ to mean “a dramatic, sudden 
situation or event which is of a passing nature in terms of time”.134 The court held that 
in the given circumstances, Soobramoney’s condition did not amount to an emergency 
which warranted for emergency medical treatment as envisaged by Section 27(3). It 
also held that the right not to be refused emergency medical treatment is independent 
from the right to life. 
 
The court then considered whether Soobramoney qualified in terms of Section 27, to 
have access to health care services provided by the state. The Court noted that the state 
has a constitutional obligation within its available resources to provide health care, and 
observed the precarious financial position of the Department of Health. The court 
held– 
“The provincial administration which is responsible for health services in KwaZulu-Natal has to make 
decisions about the funding that should be made available for health care and how such funds should be 
spent. These choices involve difficult decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the health 
budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon the priorities to be met. A court will be slow to 
interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose 
responsibility it is to deal with such matters.” 135  
 
The Court accordingly concluded that it had not been shown that the state’s failure to 
provide renal dialysis facilities for all persons suffering from chronic renal failure 
constitutes a breach of its constitutional obligations. 
 
Drawing on subsequent case law (discussed below), Liebenberg notes that a reasonable 
government programme in the context of socio-economic rights is deemed to have the 
following attributes:136 
“ A reasonable programme must –  
                                                
132  Section 11, 1996 Constitution. 
133  Section 27(3), 1996 Constitution. 
134  Soobramoney (see note 126 above), at paragraph 38. 
135  Ibid at paragraph 29. 
136  Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 152; The court in Khosa (see note 128 above) has noted that these 
factors are not a closed list, and all relevant factors particular to a case must be considered, for what is 
relevant may vary from case to case. 
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• be capable of facilitating the realisation of the right; 
• be comprehensive, coherent and co-ordinated; 
• have appropriate financial and human resources available for the programme; 
• be balanced and flexible, make appropriate provision for short, medium and long-term needs; 
• be reasonably conceived and implemented; 
• be transparent, and its contents must be known effectively to the public; and  
• make short-term provision for those whose needs are urgent and who are living in intolerable 
conditions.” 
 
Fortunately, other Constitutional Court judgments revealed a more substantive basis 
for their enquiry into the reasonableness of state action by having considered the 
aforementioned factors. 
 
The Grootboom case137 dealt with a challenge to the state's housing program under 
section 26 of the Constitution.138 Section 26 is also subject to the qualification that the 
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
 
Grootboom and the other applicants were forcibly evicted from land they were 
occupying. They approached the court for an order directing the state to provide them 
with adequate shelter in the interim while houses were allocated to them in terms of the 
state’s housing program.   
 
The court affirmed that the question in socio-economic rights litigation is not whether 
such rights are justiciable (as this is already established), but how to enforce them in a 
given case.139 This requires an assessment of the appropriate approach to interpretation, 
guided by the provisions of the right in question (in this case Section 26) – which 
obliges the state, not dissimilarly to Section 27, to (a) to take reasonable legislative 
and other measures; (b) within its available resources; and (c) to achieve the 
progressive realisation of this right;140 as well as provisions of the Constitution as a 
whole. 
 
                                                
137 Grootboom (see note 67 above). 
138 Section 26 guarantees that “everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing” 
139 Grootboom (see note 67 above) at paragraph 20. 
140 Ibid at paragraph 21. 
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It held further that, in such an interpretive process, rights must be understood in their 
textual setting and within their social and historical context.141 The court confirmed 
that all rights in the Bill of Rights are interdependent and mutually supporting.142  
 
Applying the reasonableness standard of review the court held that “a reasonable 
programme therefore must clearly allocate responsibilities and tasks to the different 
spheres of government and ensure that the appropriate financial and human resources 
are available,”143 and that “a court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether 
other more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether 
public money could have been better spent.”144 Further, the court held that the 
reasonableness of State action is impacted on by the factors of progressive realisation 
of a right and the availability of resources.145 
 
The court found the state's housing program unconstitutional, as the program in 
question was held to be unreasonable because it addressed only medium- and long-
term housing needs and excluded a significant segment of society.146  
 
The court held - 
“The issues here remind us of the intolerable conditions under which many of our people are still living. 
The respondents are but a fraction of them. It is also a reminder that, unless the plight of these 
communities is alleviated, people may be tempted to take the law into their own hands in order to escape 
these conditions. The case brings home the harsh reality that the Constitution's promise of dignity and 
equality for all remains for many a distant dream. People should not be impelled by intolerable living 
conditions to resort to land invasions. Self-help of this kind cannot be tolerated, for the unavailability of 
land suitable for housing development is a key factor in the fight against the country's housing 
shortage.”147  
 
                                                
141 Ibid at paragraph 22. 
142 Ibid at paragraph 23. 
143 Ibid at paragraph 39. 
144 Ibid at paragraph 41. 
145 Ibid at paragraphs 45 – 46. 
146 Ibid at paragraph 43; Importantly, the court held that  - “Reasonableness must also be understood in the 
context of the Bill of Rights as a whole... A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if 
it is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and equality. To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the 
degree and extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are the most urgent and whose ability 
to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of the 
right…Furthermore, the Constitution requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern. If the measures, though 
statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of those most desperate, they may not pass the test”. 
147 Ibid at paragraph 53. 
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According to Liebenberg,148 the Constitutional Court in Grootboom established a 
higher standard of reasonableness for state compliance with constitutional duties, and 
extensively interpreted the State’s obligation to take measures to progressively realise 
access to services within available resources in respect of the rights guaranteed in 
Sections 26 and Section 27.  
 
In the TAC case,149 various organizations challenged the government's refusal to 
provide the anti-retroviral drug, Nevirapine, to HIV-positive pregnant women at all 
public health institutions.  In light of concerns about the safety of Nevirapine, only a 
limited number of designated test sites were allowed to dispense Nevirapine, while the 
efficacy of the drug was being monitored. Doctors at other public facilities were 
prohibited from dispensing Nevirapine. However, government failed to provide a time-
frame within which national roll-out of the drug would occur.  
 
The court found that the government's refusal to permit the provision of Nevirapine at 
all public health facilities was unconstitutional. Following its jurisprudence in 
Grootboom, the court only examined the reasonableness of the government's program. 
The court found that it was unreasonable for the state not to dispense Nevirapine 
country-wide, since it could be provided within available resources and its efficacy had 
been reasonably established. 
 
The court ordered the court government to formulate and implement a comprehensive 
Nevirapine roll-out program nationwide as soon as possible, as well as the removal of 
all restrictions preventing doctors at public hospitals from dispensing Nevirapine. 
Further, the court instructed the government to provide Nevirapine at public hospitals 
and clinics, and to provide testing and counseling at such facilities. 
 
2.2.3 Shortcoming in national jurisprudence - guidance from  International  law: 
 
Much criticism has been leveled against the Constitutional Court for having failed to 
provide normative clarity to the content of the different socio-economic rights, and 
examining instead the obligations on government, by enquiring into the reasonableness 
                                                
148 Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 134. 
149 TAC (see note 110 above). 
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of the measures. 150 A critique of the Constitutional Court’s approach follows at 
Chapter 4 below. 
 
It is submitted that in order to address the jurisprudential difficulty identified above, 
Section 39 of the Constitution directs us to seek guidance from international and 
comparative foreign law on the issue. Ideally, the answer may lie in supplementing the 
reasonableness review with the minimum core approach, such that a new standard of 
review may be developed ensuring a more substantive engagement with the purposes 
and underlying values of socio-economic rights.  
 
2.3 International law in respect of the right to health: 
 
There has been wide-ranging entrenchment of the right to health in international and 
regional human rights treaties, as discussed below.151 Aids in the interpretation of the 
right to health especially, assist in providing clarity in respect of the entitlements and 
duties that this right imposes. 152  In respect of the minimum core, the pivotal 
instruments of analysis are the UN-CESCR General Comments 3 and 14. 
 
2.3.1 An overview of international instruments that have a bearing on the right 
 to health and the minimum core obligations on States in respect of the




(i) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African 
 Charter):153 
 
The African Charter is the primary African human rights instrument.154 Article 16 
                                                
150 L Stewart ‘Adjudicating Socio-Economic Rights Under A Transformative Constitution’ Pennsylvania 
State International Law Review Vol. 28:3 (2010) 487 492; Bilchitz (see note 11 above) 8; Pieterse (see 
note 44 above) 383. 
151 S Gruskin ‘Health and Human Rights’ accessed at www.phr.org.il/uploaded/HEALTH-HR.pdf; 
Mubangizi (see note 120 above) 114. 
152 Forman (see note 98 above) 65. 
153 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (‘Banjul 
Charter’), 27 June 1981. 
154 S Gumedze ‘HIV/AIDS and Human Rights: The role of the African Commission on Human and 
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provides that state parties “shall take the necessary measures to protect the health of 
their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick”. The 
right is not subject to progressive realisation or the availability of resources.  
 
Article 30 establishes the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, as well 
as a complaints mechanism for State violations of human rights contained in the 
Charter. The Commission’s Resolution on the HIV/AIDS Pandemic is of particular 
relevance – it declares HIV/AIDS a human rights issue and a threat against humanity. 
The Resolution “calls upon African governments to allocate national resources in a 
way that reflects a determination to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS.”155 
 
It may inferred that as South Africa has ratified the African Charter, which reiterates 
many of the socio-economic rights contained in the ICESCR, South Africa has tacitly 
acquiesced to the provisions of the ICESCR. This further enjoins our courts to defer to 
such instruments in the interpretation of socio-economic rights. 
 
(ii) The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000):156 
 
The Act, which establishes the African Union, states as one of its objectives at Article 
3 (n) “to work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable 
diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent”. 
 
(iii)   Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (2003):157 
 
In addition to various provisions which regulate a woman’s right to dignity, equality 
and non-discrimination, Article 14 provides specifically for the health and reproductive 
                                                                                                                                        
People’s Rights’ 4 African Human Rights Law Journal 181 2004 182. 
155 Resolution on the HIV/AIDS Pandemic –Threat Against Human Rights and Humanity Number 53, 
29th Ordinary Session of the ACHPR – 
1. Declares that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is a human rights issue which is a threat against humanity; 
2. Calls upon African Governments, State Parties to the Charter to allocate national resources that reflect a determination to fight 
the spread of HIV/AIDS, ensure human rights protection of those living with HIV/AIDS against discrimination, provide support to 
families for the care of those dying of AIDS, devise public health care programmes of education and carry out public awareness 
especially in view of free and voluntary HIV testing, as well as appropriate medical interventions; 
3. Calls upon the international pharmaceutical industries to make affordable and comprehensive health care available to African 
governments for urgent action against HIV/AIDS and invites international aid agencies to provide vastly increased donor 
partnership programmes for Africa including funding of research and development projects. 
156 Available at: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm. 
157 Available at: http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/women-protocol/achpr_instr_proto_women_eng.pdf. 
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rights of women, and includes the obligations of States to provide adequate, affordable 
and accessible health services.  
 
(iv) The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990):158 
 
The Charter prioritises the best interests of the child and accords children the right to 




(i) Southern Africa Development Community (SADC): 
 
• SADC HIV and AIDS Strategic Framework (2010-2015):159 
  The framework establishes objectives and actions of operation to provide 
 guidance to the response to HIV and AIDS, particularly to move towards 
 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 6160 and its targets. 
 
• SADC Protocol on Health (1999):161 
 Provisions of relevance include – Article 10, which regulates HIV/AIDS and 
 Sexually Transmitted Diseases; Article 19 requires Member States to develop 
 effective strategies for the procurement and allocation of adequate resources 
 for health care; and Article 29, which provides for the production, 
 procurement and distribution of effective drugs. 
 
 2.3.1.3 International: 
 
(i) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948):162 
 
 In terms of Article 11: “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
                                                
158 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), 
entered into force Nov. 29, 1999. Available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/afchild.htm. 
159 Available at: www.sadc.int/files/4213/5435/8109/SADCHIVandAIDSStrategyFramework2010-
2015.pdf. 
160 Millennium Development Goal 6 aims to combat HIV and AIDS and other diseases by 2015. 
161 Available at: http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/Protocol_on_Health1999.pdf 
162 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948. 
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health and well-being of himself and his family including … medical care and 
necessary social services.”  
 
(ii) The United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
 Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966):163  
 
The primary Covenant protecting socio-economic rights is the ICESCR, and it is 
particularly relevant to the interpretation of Sections 26, 27 and 29 of the Constitution 
(although it has not been ratified by South Africa), as it was a major source of 
reference for the drafting of these provisions.164 The ICESCR came into force on 3 
January 1976 and currently has 161 state parties. The right to health is provided for in 
in Article 12.165 
 
Article 12(2) also lays down broad guidelines regarding the necessary steps to be taken 
by the member states in order to achieve the full realisation of this right, including the 
duty at Article 12 (2)(c) to take steps necessary for the prevention, treatment and 
control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases. 
 
Various guidelines have been formulated to aid in the interpretation of the provisions 
of the ICESCR, and to render a normative enforceable standard in respect of the 
entitlements and obligations that flow from this right. These include International 
Legal Expert Principles, Conferences, Declarations, and the UN-CESCR General 
Comments, which in particular, define the scope of the entitlement under Article 12166 
- the right to the highest attainable standard of health, and the duties that progressive 
realisation within available resources places on States. 
 
                                                
163 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 
December 1966. 
164 Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 106; J Fitzpatrick ‘Economic and Social Rights – South Africa’ (2003) 
97 American Journal of International Law 669. 
165 Article 12 provides - 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those 
necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the  healthy development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness. 
166 Forman (see note 98 above) 66. 
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 (iii) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
 Women (CEDAW):167 
 
Article 12 of CEDAW provides that – 
 States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the 
 field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health-
 care services, including those related to family planning.  
 
 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, States Parties shall ensure to women 
 appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting 
 free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.  
 
CEDAW and the ICESCR recognise that women are affected by many of the same 
health conditions as men, but women experience them differently.168 The WHO 
identifies the following factors that have an adverse effect on the health of women, 
specifically – “the prevalence of poverty and economic dependence among women; 
their experience of violence; gender bias in the health system and society at large; 
discrimination on the grounds of race or other factors; the limited power many women 
have over their sexual and reproductive lives; and their lack of influence in decision-
making are social realities which have an adverse impact on their health”169  
 
Both the ICESCR and CEDAW require the elimination of discrimination against 
women in health care as well as guarantees of equal access for women and men to 
health-care services. Redressing discrimination in all its forms, including in the 
provision of health care, and ensuring equality between men and women are 
fundamental objectives of treating health as a human right. In this respect, CEDAW 
specifically calls upon States to ensure that “women in rural areas... participate in and 
benefit from rural development” and “have access to adequate health-care facilities... 
counselling and services in family planning.”170 
 
It is submitted that the above provisions are especially relevant in a country such as 
South Africa, where gender abuse and inequality demands our attention. Health care 
must be prioritised especially for indigent rural women infected and affected by the 
                                                
167 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
1992, A/47/38, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/453882a422.html.  
168 WHO Fact Sheet 31 (see note 23 above) 12. 
169 Ibid. 
170 CEDAW, Article 14. 
 
38 
epidemic, who face particular discrimination and hardship. 
 
(iv) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC):171 
 
According to the WHO, children are particularly vulnerable to health challenges, 
which make them especially susceptible to malnutrition and infectious diseases, as well 
as sexual and reproductive problems at adolescence.172 
 
In this regard, the CRC173 recognizes the obligation on States “to reduce infant and 
child mortality, and to combat disease and malnutrition,” especially as children are at 
risk of HIV infections through mother-to-child transmission. It is noted that a baby 
born to an HIV-positive mother has a 25 to 35 per cent chance of becoming infected 
during pregnancy, childbirth or breastfeeding. 174  Accordingly, States should take 
measures to prevent such transmission through, inter alia, education in respect of 
transmission of HIV and infant care, testing, and the provision of adequate medical and 
health care for women, infants and children. 
 
In terms of Section 28 of the Constitution, children are accorded the right “to basic 
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services”.175 The right is not 
subject to the qualifications of resource availability, nor the progressive realisation of 
human rights. Recognising the non-derogable status of children’s entitlement to good 
health care, it is imperative that the core elements of the right to health, as recognised 
by the CESCR are realised and enforced with due urgency and without unjustified 
interference by State. South Africa is placed to safeguard this right by mandating the 
provision of free basic health care to all children under-six years,176 and by conferring 
vital importance to primary health care as directed by the Declaration of Alma Ata. 
This, it is submitted, extends to the provision of ART, HIV testing, care and 
counselling, and education.  
 
                                                
171 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 1577, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html. 
172 WHO Fact Sheet 31 (see note 23 above) 14. 
173 Convention on the Rights of the Child (see note 171 above) Article 24. 
174 WHO Fact Sheet 31 (see note 23 above) 14. 
175 1996 Constitution 
176 National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
 
39 
It is further submitted that this also places a weighty obligation on the State to address 
the social dimension of the pandemic experienced by the large number of child-headed 
households and orphans, as a result of the AIDS pandemic. The minimum core, of 
necessity, entails that the State reviews or introduces social welfare schemes that 
would adequately ensure the well-being of such vulnerable children in our society. 
 
(v) Declaration of Alma-Ata, 1978:177 
 
Numerous conferences and declarations, such as the International Conference on 
Primary Health Care (resulting in the Declaration of Alma-Ata), have also helped 
clarify various aspects of public health relevant to the right to health and have 
reaffirmed commitments to its realization. 
 
The Declaration confirms that primary health care is essential as “it forms an integral 
part both of the country's health system, of which it is the central function and main 
focus, and of the overall social and economic development of the community”.178 The 
prominence given to primary health care highlights that the main health problems in 
the community will be addressed by “providing promotive, preventive, curative and 
rehabilitative services accordingly”.179  
 
(vi) United Nations Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development 
 Goals (“MDGs”):180 
 
The MDGs, agreed to by Member States at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, are 
aimed at reducing global poverty by half, by 2015, by way of a series of specific 
goals.181 It has served to highlight the plight of the global poor, by mobilising donor 
involvement and aid, and contributions to health care, such as ARVs. It has facilitated 
                                                




180 See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. 
181 The MDGs include: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; 
promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat 




the co-operation of governments, corporations and non-governmental organisations.182 
 
Significant MDG success has been realised in respect of the US President's Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) launched in 2003. It has improved access to AIDS 
treatment in the developing world significantly. The MDG Health Alliance, founded in 
2011, is comprised of business and NGO leaders around the world working toward the 
MDG health targets, including the elimination of mother-to-child HIV transmission. 
As at 2011 more than eight million people worldwide were receiving AIDS 
treatment.183 
 
(vii) UN Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS:184 
 
The UN Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS acknowledges that “prevention of 
HIV infection must be the mainstay of the national, regional and international response 
to the epidemic”.185 It further recognises that “all countries must continue to emphasize 
widespread and effective prevention, including awareness-raising campaigns through 
education, nutrition, information and health-care services”.186 Pavone interprets this 
undertaking to include ensuring a wide range of prevention programmes in all 
countries that must be “culturally sensitive and available in local languages which aim 
to reduce risky behaviour; encourage responsible sexual behaviour; reduce harm 
related to drug use; treatment for sexually transmitted infections, and voluntary and 
confidential counselling and testing.” 187 
 
Paragraph 15 of the Declaration, in particular, states “access to medication is a 
fundamental element for achieving progressively the right of everyone to the highest 
possible standard of physical and mental health.” 
 
 
                                                
182 McArthur, JW ‘What the Millennium Development Goals Have Accomplished’ 92 Foreign Affairs 
152 2013. 
183 Ibid. 
184 General Assembly resolution S-26/2 of 27 July 2001. 
185 Ibid at paragraph 17, which proceeds to confirm that “prevention, care, support and treatment for 
those infected and affected by HIV/AIDS are mutually reinforcing elements of an effective response and 
must be integrated in a comprehensive approach to combat the epidemic”. 
186 Ibid at paragraph 18. 
187 Pavone (see note 32 above) 97. 
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2.4 Foreign law: 
 
Section 39 (1) (c) of the Constitution provides that regard may be had to foreign 
jurisprudence in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. The following jurisdictions 
have proven influential in respect of the enactment of health rights in domestic law and 
policy, and/or their ratification and incorporation of the ICESCR in domestic law; and 
with regard to the expansion of these provisions to the rights of people living with 
AIDS. Uganda demonstrates the effectiveness of grass-roots policy implementation, 
and provides a useful reference as to how the minimum core (in respect of HIV-
positive individuals) may be incorporated in domestic legislation. Colombia has shown 
the success of progressive judicial mechanisms that are available to the masses of 
people who ordinarily would not be able to access justice. Both countries encompass 
aspects of how implementation of the minimum core would prove beneficial for 
individuals in greatest need. 
 
2.4.1 Uganda:  
 
Uganda acceded to the ICESCR on 21 January 1987,188 and is considered to be 
example of how an African country, believed to be more resource-challenged than 
South Africa, has achieved success at combatting the AIDS epidemic. 189 It is submitted, 
however, that while Uganda is a model of how effective policy implementation may 
lead to successes at combating the epidemic, it is also an example of how weak policy 
execution in turn leads to rising infection rates. Further, it demonstrates that effective 
AIDS policy cannot be successful if the State endorses discriminatory practices, such 
as legislating against homosexuality. 
 
The Ugandan constitution190 contains no distinct provisions for the right to access 
health care. Instead, it comprises various National Objectives and Directive Principles 
incorporating Social and Economic Objectives,191 which include health services, and 
                                                
188 Accession to the ICESCR occurs if ratification of the Covenant occurs without it being signed first. 
189 Mubangizi (see note 61 above) 106; Forman (see note 11 above) 717; Watchirs (see note 16 above) 
81. 
190 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995. 
191 National Objective XIV. 
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Medical Services, 192 that guide the state in interpreting the law and implementing any 
policy decisions.  
 
At the peak of HIV infection in the country in 1992, the government initiated 
aggressive prevention and treatment strategies by way of national programmes193 
involving civil society to better improve policy implementation. This paved the way 
for infection levels to fall to Uganda’s lowest rate of 6.4% in 2006,194 and has been 
attributed to strong leadership, an “open approach to combating the epidemic” and “a 
strong multi-sectoral, decentralized and community response.”195  
 
Civil society in Uganda has also been praised in the implementation of HIV policies.196 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are said to have contributed fundamentally in 
providing care and support to the infected and affected, via effective communication 
approaches. CSOs are believed to be successful in their mandate because of their 
flexibility and ability to reach marginalised populations in remote areas.197 South 
Africa has achieved similar success in respect of our own CSOs, such as the highly 
dynamic Treatment Action Campaign.198 The value of community-based support in the 
fight against AIDS cannot be over-emphasised, and must be stimulated in order to 
ensure that people on the fringe of society and at grassroots level are not neglected. 
 
Current records, unfortunately, indicate that HIV prevalence in Uganda has risen from 
6.4% to 7.3% over the last few years.199  Tumwesigye, et al,200 acknowledge that the 
                                                
192 National Objective XX. 
193 For example – (1) the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) identifies HIV/AIDS as one of the 
priority areas to be addressed by, inter alia, the provision of ARVs; (2) the Health Sector Strategic Plan, 
which identify specific targets for the prevention and control of HIV/ AIDS, including the scale up of 
voluntary counselling and testing and the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) services, 
and increasing the offering of HIV/AIDS care with anti-retroviral therapy; and (3) the ARV Policy, 
which aims at universal access to anti-retroviral treatment to all that are clinically eligible for it, and a 
strategic plan on HIV/AIDS, which provides for care and treatment. 
194 www.avert.org/hiv-aids-uganda.htm; accessed 11/11/13. 
195 Ibid; Global AIDS Response Progress Report: Uganda Jan 2010-Dec 2012:1 
196 Mubangizi (see note 61 above) 127. 
197 Ibid. 
198 M Heywood ‘South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining Law and Social Mobilization to 
Realize the Right to Health’ available at http://www.section27.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/journal-
HR-practice-heywood.pdf. 
199 Ibid; UNAIDS Global Report 2012; www.irinnews.org/report/97651/uganda-government-under-
pressure-to-boost-arv-funding, accessed 12/11/2013. 
200 Tumwesigye et al. ‘Policy development, implementation and evaluation by the AIDS control 
program in Uganda: a review of the processes’ Health Research Policy and Systems 2013, 11:7, 
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response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda had led to an overall reduction in HIV 
prevalence from 18% in the early 1980s to 7.3% in 2011. The writers attribute 
Uganda’s success mainly to its AIDS Control Program (ACP), which has developed 
and revised several HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment policies to improve the 
lives of people living with HIV/AIDS. However, concerns have developed regarding 
the delays experienced currently in policy development and revision processes. These 
delays subsequently affect timely implementation of critical evidence-based 
interventions, and it is said, “may partly explain the current stagnation of HIV 
prevalence”.201 
 
Valuable statistical information, such as the above, is procured via Uganda’s “Country 
Progress Report,” submitted to the UN-CESCR, as part of the mandatory reporting 
obligations of member States.202 It is submitted that Uganda provides a useful example 
of the significance of ratification of (or accession to) the ICESCR, in this regard – as 
Member States are obliged to provide such reports. In this way, States are better 
monitored and held accountable for their actions and inactions. 
 
Uganda is in the process of enacting the HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Bill of 
2009, which although controversial in respect of its criminalisation of HIV provisions, 
specifically provides for State responsibilities in respect of HIV control. The Bill 
mandates the obligation to “ devise measures to – 
• ensure the right of access and equitable distribution of health facilities, goods 
and services including essential medicines on a non-discriminatory basis;  
• provide universal HIV treatment to all persons on a non-discriminatory basis;  
• process, adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of 
action for HIV and AIDS;  
• prevent and control of HIV transmission;  
• take measures to develop and promote awareness rights and duties imposed on 
persons under this Act;  
• take measures to develop and implement programmes in order to promote the 
rights of persons;  
                                                                                                                                        
available at: http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/11/1/7. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Global AIDS Response Progress Report: Uganda January 2010 - December 2012.  
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• promote and ensure involvement of people living with HIV in participating in 
government programmes;  
• mainstream HIV in all government sectors; and  
• provide care and support to persons living with HIV.”203  
 
It is submitted that the afore-mentioned provision enforces the minimum core 
obligations as set out in the ICESCR, with specific reference to HIV-positive 
individuals.  
 
The East African Community HIV/AIDS Regional Bill of 2010, which seeks to 
prevent and manage the spread of HIV/Aids and to promote human rights of persons 
living with the disease, has been assented to by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. 
The Bill is aimed at mandating partner states to play a key role in controlling and 
managing the disease, by providing HIV/AIDS related services, guaranteeing the right 
to privacy of people living with HIV/AIDS and prohibiting HIV-related discrimination, 
and ensuring the provision of quality health care and social services for persons living 
with HIV and their care-givers. The Bill is awaiting signature by other East African 
heads of state to become a binding law in the region. 
 
It is submitted that legislation such as the above, which sets out the obligations of the 
State, are in line with ICESCR, and provide a clear mandate to government in respect 
of its responsibilities to those living with HIV/AIDS. It also serves to clarify for 
affected individuals what they may expect from their leaders, and hold them 
accountable should obligations not be met. This would be pivotal in South Africa, 
especially in the event of “legislative and executive lethargy”204 or inaction by the 
State in providing for basic needs. 
 
In summary, the above analysis indicates that Uganda provides a useful measure of 
comparison for South Africa. It is a developing African country plagued by resource 
constraints, and embattled by the AIDS epidemic. Effective policy implementation is 
key, as well as engaging with community structures to activate the response. Uganda 
reinforces the value of ratification of the ICESCR in terms of its reporting mechanism, 
                                                
203 Section 27 – State Obligations. 
204 Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 40. 
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and the means to hold government accountable to its people. 
 
2.4.2 South America – Republic of Colombia 
 
The Republic of Colombia signed the ICESCR on 21 December 1966, and ratified the 
Covenant on 29 October 1969. 
 
The Colombian Constitution of 1991 entrenches the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights in certain circumstances, 205  and establishes the Colombian Constitutional Court. 
The right to health is constitutionally protected in Article 49 of the Colombian 
Constitution,206 and is supported by the tutela action, 207 which is enshrined in Article 
86 of the Constitution.208 
 
Young records that the tutela action may be presented before any judge “for the 
immediate protection of a fundamental human right.”209  In light of the urgent nature of 
the action, locus standi and the court’s powers are deemed very generous in tutelage 
action. The court may issue specific directives to the State in respect of measures to be 
taken in order to address the right violation.210  Further, the action “imposes strict time 
limitations for judges, and sanctions for public officials, including jail for contempt of 
court if they fail to comply.”211 A large number of tutela actions have been directed at 
the right to health.  
 
In 2003, the Constitutional Court212 entrenched a “minimum core” approach with a 
view to clarify the right to health, by specifying core obligations. The Constitutional 
                                                
205 KG Young ‘The Comparative Fortunes of the Right to Health’ 26 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
179 (2013) 180. 
206 Article 49 of the Constitución Politica de Colombia provides – 
Attention to health and environmental sanitation are public services of the responsibility of the State. The access to services of 
promotion, protection and recovery of health are guaranteed to all persons. It corresponds to the State to organize, direct and 
regulate the provision of health services . . . in accordance with the principles of efficiency, universality and solidarity. It 
corresponds to the State, to establish policies for the provision of health services by private entities, and to exercise supervision 
and control over them. Likewise, to establish the competences of the Nation, the territorial entities and individuals and to 
determine the contributions of their responsibility in the terms and conditions specified in the law. Health services shall be 
organized in a decentralized manner, by level of care and with participation of the community.   The law shall specify the terms  
under which basic care for all inhabitants will be gratuitous and obligatory. Every person has the duty to provide for 
comprehensive attention to their health and to that of their community. 
207 Young (see note 205 above) 183. 
208 Ibid 185. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 129. 
211 Young (see note 205 above) 185. 
212 Colombian Constitutional Court Judgment T-859, 2003. 
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Court’s judgment in Decision T-760 213 was the first ruling “to adopt structural 
guidelines to specifically order the government to address the major problems in the 
healthcare system”214; notably the Court adopted the right to health framework set out 
by the ICESCR.215  
 
In its judgment, the Court established state obligations generated by the right to health, 
and emphasised the importance of judicial supervision  in implementing the right, and 
for executive accountability. It also reaffirmed the responsibility of the state to adopt 
measured programmes   towards the progressive realization  of the right to health; and 
stressed that “the right to health calls for transparency and access to information, as 
well as for evidence-based planning and coverage decisions based on participatory 
processes.”216 Further, the Court established an essential minimum core to the right to 
health that was immediately enforceable.217 
 
There are important lessons to be learnt from the Colombian experience. Liebenberg 
submits that the scope of the Preamble to the Constitution218 allows for this principle of 
“social justice,”219 which may prove highly beneficial for the indigent. For one, a 
tutela-like court action would be particularly relevant and helpful to the destitute and 
disempowered who seek to enforce their rights. The Colombian Constitutional Court is 
evidence of how greater access to the judicial system may offer better protection of the 
rights of thousands of people. Further, it is apparent that the Colombian Constitutional 
Court has wielded strong control over health policies and programmes. This illustrates 
the value of court oversight of State action, so as to promote accountability and the 




                                                
213 Colombian Constitutional Court Judgment T-760, 2008. 
214 Young (see note 205 above) 191. 
215 AE Yamin ‘How do Courts set Health Policy’ Plos Medicine Vol 6 Feb (2009) Issue 2 147; 
Chowdhury (see note 75 above) 8. 
216 Ibid 149. 
217 Ibid. 
218 1996 Constitution. 
219 Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 129. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
Application of the Minimum Core concept to the right to health under Section 27 
in respect of HIV-positive persons 
 
3.1 The need to defer to International Law: 
 
In the cases discussed above, the Constitutional court is criticised for not providing 
normative clarity on the particular socio-economic right at stake220 – for it is expected 
to be well-suited to provide content to social rights and the standards of compliance 
that they impose.221 A further view is that all policies of the state must be evaluated 
and that this too falls to the courts. It is not expected to entail the judicial rewriting of 
policy or the prescription of specific measures; however, the court is required to set a 
universal standard, such that the content of the right provides the gauge against which 
legislative measures should be examined.222 
 
It may be said that the court in Grootboom and TAC provided some content to the 
rights in question in its judgments.223 This approach must be developed, and it is 
suggested that the court’s rejection of the minimum core be re-assessed and reconciled 
with international law and theory so that “the work of the Constitutional Court is not 
seen to reinforce indefensible objections to social rights,”224 such as the right to health 
being “conceptually amorphous as to be meaningless”, and making “zero-sum claims 
on budgets that would irrationally distort resource allocations to the detriment of the 
public good.”225 
 
According to Mubangizi,226 certain provisions in international instruments are intrinsic 
to the enforcement of rights in national legal systems. This is especially so, it is 
submitted, in the light of conflict and difficulties in constitutional interpretation; so 
                                                
220 Stewart (see note 150 above) 508. 
221 Pieterse (see note 43 above) 232. 
222 Stewart (see note 150 above) 509. 
223 Bilchitz (see note 11 above) 8; Davis (see note 41 above) 313. 
224 Forman (see note 98) 62. 
225 Ibid 63. 
226 Mubangizi (see note 120 above) 114. 
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much so, that Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution mandates the consideration of 
international jurisprudence in its interpretation.227 
 
This is the case despite the fact that certain international human rights instruments are 
not directly applicable to South Africa, and notwithstanding that South Africa may not 
have ratified or even signed the instrument in question.228 By virtue of Section 
39(1)(b), which obliges “any court, tribunal or forum to consider International law 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights”, courts are required to consider all International 
law, not only that which is binding.229  Further guidance in this regard is obtained from 
the Constitutional Court judgment in S v Makwanyane,230 which provides in respect of 
Section 35 of the Interim Constitution 231  (the equivalent of Section 39 of the 
Constitution), that public International law would include non-binding as well as 
binding law.  
 
It is also important to bear in mind that the Constitution requires that when interpreting 
any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation 
that is consistent with International law to any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with International law.232 
 
Liebenberg233 is of the opinion that this recognition of international law is also 
necessary to recognise the constitutional receptiveness to the norms and values of the 
international community; that, it “resonates with the reciprocal way in which 
international law and institutions supported the struggle against apartheid, and were in 
turn, influenced by this struggle.” It likewise, gives effect to the constitutional 
commitment in the Preamble “to build a united and democratic South Africa able to 
take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations (by contributing) to 
                                                
227 Section 39 – Interpretation of the Bill of Rights provides:  
  1.When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum - 
      (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
      (b) must consider international law; and 
      (c) may consider foreign law. 
228  As is the case with South Africa and the ICESCR – see discussion below at Paragraph 3.2. 
229  Mubangizi (see note 120 above) 114; M Oliver ‘Constitutional Perspectives on the Enforcement of 
Socio-Economic Rights’ 2002 33 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 117. 
230  (1995) 3 SA 391 (CC). 
231  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 
232  Section 233 - Application of international law. 
233  Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 101. 
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the development of international law based on our domestic experiences of human 
rights and democratic transformation.”234 
 
3.2 Ratification of the ICESCR by South Africa: 
 
The ICESCR was signed by our then President, the revered Nelson Mandela on 03 
October 1994, auspiciously, at the advent of our new democracy, heralding South 
Africa’s intention to become bound by the provisions of the Covenant, and signifying 
hope for the realisation of the rights of the poor and those disenfranchised by the 
previous regime. However, the Covenant has, to date, not been ratified.235 In terms of 
section 231(2) of the Constitution, the ICESCR must be approved by Parliament by 
way of a resolution of ratification before it becomes legally binding upon the Republic.  
 
As a result, the ICESCR is not yet binding on South Africa, but is persuasive. South 
Africa has for a while subscribed to the norms and standards contained in the ICESCR 
as it has ratified the African Charter, which carries forward many of the socio-
economic rights contained in the ICESCR.236 It has also included justiciable socio-
economic rights in the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution, that are 
premised on the provisions of the ICESCR. 
 
Cabinet announced, however, on 10 October 2012, its decision to ratify the Covenant 
by tabling it before Parliament for approval237 – a decision that had been welcomed by 
civil society organisations and the South African Human Rights Commission. This is, 
unfortunately, still pending. 
 
The People’s Health Movement of South Africa (PHM) highlights that the importance 
of South Africa’s ratification of the ICESCR, is the link forged between socio-
economic rights and meeting the UN MDGs.238 It is deemed essential for enforcing the 
                                                
234  Ibid; In Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa (2005) (4) SA 325 (CC), the 
Constitutional Court held that our Constitution recognises and asserts that after decades of isolation, 
South Africa is now a member of the community of nations, and a bearer of obligations and 
responsibilities in terms of international law. 
235 Anecdotally, this has prompted the Black Sash to refer to the scenario as one where “South Africa is 
engaged but not married” in respect of the ICESCR; http://www.blacksash.org.za/files/icescropinion.pdf. 





rights of those living in poverty, and has particular relevance to South Africa in light of 
the majority of communities who do not have access to the most basic human rights, 
nor to justice. 
 
Petherbridge239 notes that through its ratification of the ICESCR, South Africa will – 
 
• bind itself to the standards of the ICESCR, thereby necessitating domestic 
legislation and policies in line with the obligations contained the ICESCR; 
• be subject to the reporting procedures carried out by the UN-CESCR in terms 
of which the implementation of the rights are monitored through the assessment 
of State reports; 
• be accountable if implementation is not properly carried out; and 
• be assisted, if necessary in improving the implementation of the rights 
protected in the Covenant. 
 
In particular, the ratification of the ICESCR would also require that South African 
courts “align their jurisprudence with the obligations set out in the ICESCR”.240
 
This 
would require recognition and protection of the “minimum core obligation” imposed 
by the Covenant. Petherbridge further submits that ratification would therefore see that 
courts develop the reasonableness test so as to incorporate a requirement that the 
government accord priority protection to basic socio-economic needs.   
 
3.3 Application of the ICESCR to the South African right to health: 
 
3.3.1 Interpretation of the Article 12 Right to Health: 
 
 3.3.1.1 UN-CESCR General Comments: 
 
The main sources for interpreting the ICESCR are the General Comments adopted by 
the UN-CESCR, the primary supervisory organ in terms of the ICESCR.  Although not 
legally binding, they carry persuasive weight as indications of how the UN-CESCR 
                                                




interprets the provisions of the ICESCR.241 These interpretations serve as benchmarks 
against which to measure State action or inaction, and importantly, prescribe specific 
content to the right to health. 
 
Primarily of relevance herein, are CESCR General Comments 3 and 14.  
 
(i) General Comment No. 3 on Article 2(1) on the Nature of State Parties 
 Obligations ICESCR, 1990: 
 
General Comment 3 underlines the responsibility of the government to “take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum extent of its available resources, with the 
view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised 
[herein].”242 
 
It was adopted on 14 December 1990, and significantly, the Committee confirms that 
States parties have a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights enunciated in the Covenant, including 
essential primary health care.243 
 
In ascribing the above minimum core obligation, the UN-CESCR is still cognisant of 
the limitations of resource constraints on a country, that may impact on that country’s 
ability to meet such an obligation.  Of significance is Paragraph 9,244 in respect of 
                                                
241 Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 107. 
242 B Rubenson Health and Human Rights’ Health Division Document 2002:2A; Commissioned by Sida, 
Department for Democracy and Social Development, Health Division 12. 
243 UN-CESCR General Comment 3 at paragraph 10, which provides – 
On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the Committee, as well as by the body that preceded it, over a period  of 
more than a decade of examining States parties' reports the Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure 
the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, 
for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential 
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge 
its obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core 
obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d'être. By the same token, it must be noted that any assessment as to whether 
a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying within the country 
concerned. Article 2 (1) obligates each State party to take the necessary steps "to the maximum of its available resources". In 
order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources 
it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter 
of priority, those minimum obligations. 
244 Paragraph 9 provides – 
The principal obligation of result reflected in article 2 (1) is to take steps "with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized" in the Covenant. The term "progressive realization" is often used to describe the intent of this 
phrase. The concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the fact that full realization of all economic, social and 
cultural rights will generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of time… Nevertheless, the fact that realization over time, 
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Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR, which holds that the obligations therein are subject to a 
standard of progressive realisation. In terms of General Comment 3, progressive 
realisation means that while States can justify some health care deficiencies, they 
cannot justify the failure to work towards rectifying them.245 There is thus a minimum 
obligation on government, beyond which rights are to be progressively realised. Our 
courts have recognised the legitimacy hereof.246 
 
(ii) General Comment No. 14 on Article 12 on the Right to Health ICESCR, 
 2001: 
 
In this Comment, the UN-CESCR in collaboration with the WHO has developed 
comprehensive guidelines for the interpretation of “the right to health”. It discusses 
how “health” should be understood, the obligations of the state to respect, protect and 
fulfil247 the right to health, and what the responsibility of the individual should be.248 
Critically, it defines the requirements of the minimum core to the right to health,249 as 
well as obligations of comparable priority.250  
 
Thus, in order to meet the requirements of this right, the social determinants of the 
right must also be addressed. Further, in terms of General Comment 14, the right to 
health prescribes essential elements such as public health and health care facilities, 
goods and services, including hospitals, clinics, personnel and essential drugs, which 
are available in sufficient quality and standards, accessible to all physically, 
                                                                                                                                        
or in other words progressively, is foreseen under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all 
meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility  device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the 
difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the 
phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d'être, of the Covenant, which is to establish clear 
obligations for States parties in respect of the full realization of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would 
require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in 
the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources. 
245 Forman (see note 98 above) 66. 
246 Grootboom (see note 67 above) at paragraph 45. 
247 The obligation to fulfil is further divided into the following elements that must be satisfied – 
(a) availability, which includes functioning health care facilities as well as the underlying determinants for health such as 
water, sanitation, housing and food;  
(b) accessibility – which requires non-discriminatory access, physical accessibility, economic accessibility and 
accessibility to information for all sections of the population;  
(c) acceptability – the need for respect for the individual and the culture, medical ethics, the confidentiality of the 
individual and for gender and generation sensitivity. It includes the need for ability among health staff and decision makers 
to speak and understand the language as well as the beliefs around health and disease of the community and need for 
participation and influence from those concerned; and 
(d) quality – which requires that health services should provide care, which is scientifically and medically appropriate and 
of good quality. This requires adequate regulations and control mechanisms and continuous training of staff.   
248 Rubenson (see note 242 above) 13; UN-CESCR General Comment 14, Paragraph 12.  
249 UN-CESCR General Comment 14 (see note 91 above). 
250 UN-CESCR General Comment 14 (see note 92 above). 
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economically, and without distinction, and of good quality. 
 
General Comment 14 places a non-derogable obligation on States,251 whereby a State 
cannot under any circumstances justify non-compliance with the core obligations.  This 
is a development from General Comment 3, which provided that a State could justify 
non-compliance with minimum core obligations by demonstrating that every effort to 
use all resources available to satisfy those obligations as a matter of priority has been 
made. This development, it is submitted, is interpreted to indicate the level of 
commitment required of States - that it is not a matter of “refusal” but “incapability” 
to meet its obligations that is of importance.252 The former will not be accepted on any 
level, while the latter affords States a measure of flexibility taking into account 
maximum available resources.  
 
3.3.2 Relevance of the above instruments to HIV-positive individuals: 
 
General Comment 14 requires that health care facilities, goods and services should be 
available in sufficient quantity bearing the State’s developmental level in mind. These 
should be physically and economically accessible without discrimination. Furthermore, 
they should be ethically and culturally acceptable, scientifically and medically 
appropriate, and of good quality.253  
 
Of importance in respect of HIV/AIDS infected and affected individuals, is the 
obligation on States to provide access to essential medicines.254 The right to treatment 
involves the provision of urgent healthcare and assistance, while prevention and 
education programmes must also be initiated. Further, aid should be provided with the 
confidentiality of individuals protected and on a non-discriminatory basis.255 
 
In terms of Articles 2 and 3 of the ICESCR any discrimination in access to healthcare 
and underlying determinants of health, as well as to the means for their purchase, is 
                                                
251 General Comment 14, paragraph 47. 
252 Ibid; Forman (see note 98 above) 68. 
253 General Comment 14 at paragraphs 8, 9, 12 & 13. 
254 General Comment 14 at paragraph 16; WHO Fact sheet 31 (see note 23) 3. 
255 Pavone (see note 32 above) 103. 
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strictly prohibited.256 This is an obligation of immediate effect. Equality of access to 
healthcare also implies provision of healthcare facilities to those who are unable to 
provide for themselves. This should be realised through appropriate health resource 
allocation.257  
 
The World Health Organisation has derived the following basic, or core, entitlements 
to the right to health from Article 12 of the ICESCR and General Comment 14 – 
 “The right to –  
• a system of health protection providing equality of opportunity for everyone to 
enjoy the highest attainable level of health;  
• prevention, treatment and control of diseases;  
• access to essential medicines; 
• emergency medical treatment  
• maternal, child and reproductive health;  
• equal and timely access to basic health services;  
• the provision of health-related education and information; and 
• participation of the population in health-related decision-making at the national 
and community levels.”258 
 
Based on Section 27’s genesis in the ICESCR, as well as the provisions of General 
Comment 14, it is submitted that Section 27 may be said to contain the above 
minimum core entitlements as well. 
 
One may surmise thus: a minimum obligation to HIV-positive individuals under the 
right to health encompasses the duty of treatment and prevention and control in 
respect of the epidemic, on a non-discriminatory basis. 
 
 3.4 Does a minimum core obligation in respect of HIV/AIDS prioritise 
 treatment over prevention given resource constraints? 
 
Anti-retroviral drugs are used to prevent the transmission of the HIV virus in cases 
                                                
256 General Comment 14 at paragraphs 18 & 19. 
257 Ibid. 
258 WHO Fact Sheet 31 (see note 23 above) 4. 
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where individuals have been exposed to it in various circumstances (as prevention); 
and administered to HIV positive individuals at a certain stage of the progression of the 
HI virus to suppress HIV viral activity and thus to prolong and improve the person's 
quality of life (as treatment).  
 
The argument against allocating medication to prevention, however, is that in a 
resource-constrained country such as South Africa, diverting a major share of ART to 
prevention could deny treatment to deserving people.259 A further concern is that 
infected patients in the early stages of the disease have a “virtual certainty of benefiting” 
from ARV drugs while “much greater uncertainty surrounds the benefits for prevention” 
with PrEP - given that the “effectiveness of that method depends on constant and 
appropriate use by people who engage in high-risk behaviour.”260  As such, in terms of 
this argument, as long as ARVs need to be allocated between prevention and treatment, 
first priority should be given to treatment, and second priority to the treatment-as-
prevention (TasP) strategy.  
 
Singh advances the argument that a state’s minimum core obligation in relation to HIV 
does extend to PrEP, especially where vulnerable individuals are unable to access 
interventions because of debilitating social factors.261 Given our resource constraints, 
Singh suggests that policymakers may have to consider restricting PrEP access in the 
short to medium term to vulnerable individuals in ‘urgent need’ based on the 
contextual epidemic and that “human rights doctrines would hold that such 
prioritization is equitable and reasonable”.262 However, determining what constitutes 
‘urgent need’ and who qualifies for this status will have to occur in a transparent 
manner to be ethically defensible. This, according to Singh, will necessitate 
“engagement between health officials at all levels of government, social welfare, the 
scientific community, civil society, and affected communities.”263  
 
It is thus concluded that a government’s minimum core obligation in regard to the right 
to health in the context of HIV includes both the progressive provision of treatment 
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and prevention interventions. The rollout of new interventions should not, however, 
compromise existing effective programmes.264 
 
Karim records findings that since the 2010 Vienna AIDS conference, five studies have 
demonstrated that ART, when used as prescribed, either to treat HIV-infected 
individuals (treatment for prevention) or as oral/topical pre-exposure prophylaxis 
(PrEP), effectively prevents the sexual transmission of HIV.265 
 
In this respect, the precariously vulnerable position of women in sero-discordant 
relationships must be highlighted. Gender inequality, abuse and failure to respect the 
rights of women and girls are critical social determinants of the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
in South Africa. For example, disempowerment as a result of cultural practices may 
prevent women from negotiating safe sex practices.266 Young women in particular, are 
especially vulnerable to infection. In addition, women have generally less access to 
available treatments and adequate information. They are also disproportionately 
affected by the burden of caregiving. 
 
Following the recognition by the WHO in its June 2013 Guidelines on Prevention and 
Treatment of Infectious Diseases, that “when sero-discordant couples are identified and 
where additional HIV prevention choices for them are needed, daily oral pre-exposure 
prophylaxis may be considered as a possible additional intervention for the uninfected 
partner,”267 states should put in place laws and policies that challenge gender inequality 
and social norms that contribute to HIV/AIDS expansion. They should also provide 
equal access to HIV-related information, education, means of prevention, and health 
services. Significantly, they should ensure women’s sexual and reproductive rights, 
which are key to HIV prevention. In this respect preventing HIV transmission in 
pregnant women, mothers and their children is crucial. States should also protect 
women against sexual violence, which makes them more vulnerable to HIV infection 
and other sexually transmitted infections.268 
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In respect of vulnerable women in South Africa, especially the millions of 
disempowered black rural women and girls, it is submitted that prevention may be 
tantamount to treatment in saving lives. With this in mind, there can be no debate 
regarding the need for ART as prevention, and no talk of prioritising one over the other. 
As Singh has suggested, “treatment rollout and PrEP rollout should occur 
simultaneously, and concurrent to a sustained and expanded HCT programme, and all 
role players should maximise their efforts to integrate HCT, treatment and prevention 
in an efficient and cost-effective way.” 269  Karim similarly argues “a potential 
combination of therapeutic and prophylactic antiretroviral strategies brings the 
prospect of HIV control within reach.”270 
 
The argument in favour of a combined HIV prevention strategy includes a “structural 
approach” to prevention, which involves the process of selecting a set of interventions 
that address structural factors to reduce HIV risk at the individual and/or group 
level.271 It is submitted however, that there is no “one size fits all” structural approach 
that is appropriate for all epidemics, settings, or target populations.272 It is important to 
choose interventions according to an analysis of the particular characteristics of the 
target population, the context, and of the risk to be addressed for HIV prevention in 
that specific setting.  
 
3.5 The critical issue of access to health care – intellectual property barriers 
 and access to medicines 
 
The high cost of medicines and a lack of resources inevitably means that there is 
limited access to medicines for the treatment of HIV opportunistic infections and ART. 
This amounts to a limitation of fundamental human rights of those infected with the 
disease, especially the rights to human dignity, equality and freedom.273 As such, 
effective resolution of the HIV/AIDS crisis will depend significantly on whether the 
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majority of infected and affected South Africans are able to access to essential drugs 
for prevention or treatment of the epidemic and opportunistic diseases.274 High rates of 
HIV infection and high mortality rates make improved access to treatment imperative. 
 
Do governments have a duty to provide antiretroviral treatment?  
 
The Covenantal and constitutional duty on government to fulfil obligations, which in 
turn gives rise to the issues of accessibility, acceptability, quality and availability, is of 
relevance in respect of AIDS medicines and health care facilities.  
 
De Vos notes that one of the core obligations identified in terms of General Comment 
14 above, is the right of access of all individuals to essential drugs, as defined in the 
WHO essential drugs list.275 It is recorded that anti-retroviral medicines were included 
in the essential drugs list at the 12th meeting of the Expert Committee on the Selection 
and Use of Essential Medicines. 276 
 
Access to ART is thus a fundamental core obligation of the State. While South Africa 
has taken steps towards lowering the costs of drugs by the adoption of the Medicines 
and Related Substances Amendment Act,277 there is a pressing need for South Africa to 
take urgent steps to address the lack of access to many important, life-saving medicines 
and curb the rising costs of medicines.  
 
Through vigilant activism by the TAC and civil society, anti-competitive complaints, 
as well as the licensing and availability of generic medicines, a number of affordable 
1st line antiretroviral medicines for HIV is now accessible.278 Generic competition has 
reduced the cost of ARVs from around US$10 000.00 per patient per year, to 
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approximately US$ 150.00 per patient per year within a few years.279 However, as 
noted by the TAC, “some important 1st and 2nd line medicines remain unavailable 
because of patent protection.” 280 In addition, currently “there are no 3rd line 
antiretroviral treatments provided through the public sector, despite the growing 
number of patients in need of these medicines.” 281 
 
The issue of drug patents is therefore critical to the accessibility of health care in South 
Africa. The shortage of affordable drugs and the lack of a reliable supply, obstruct HIV 
treatment and prevention programmes. 282 Further, patients who have commenced with 
a treatment regime are compromised if their drug supply is halted or interrupted.  It is 
thus imperative that this core obligation be stringently fulfilled. 
 
It is further believed that the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications as established in Article 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR “implies 
the duty for developed countries to make antiretroviral drugs available to those 
countries that cannot afford it but are most severely affected by the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic.” 283  
 
Gray and Vawda note that the South African case presents both challenges and 
opportunities for access to medicines.284 As noted above, South Africa has failed to use 
all available flexibilities, and has a weak patent-granting system, but this the authors 
attribute ultimately to a lack of political will, which they censure. It is suggested that 
“stronger leadership regarding its obligations to its citizens”285 is required, as well as 
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Implementation and Enforcement of the Minimum Core, and the path going 
forward: 
  
4.1 Mechanisms of enforcement: 
 
The concept of ‘minimum core obligations’ requires that meeting basic needs must 
take priority in the State’s realisation of rights. Forman suggests that inaccess to health 
care where there are resources and no scarcity, but because of corrupt or neglectful 
governance “shall be construed as a human rights violation of the highest order.”286  
 
In terms of the 2011-2012 Consolidated General Report on National and Provincial 
Audit Outcomes,287 findings in respect of government expenditure and accounting 
include288 – 
• 292 (58%) auditees submitted financial statements with material misstatements; 
• Unauthorised expenditure totaled R2.9-billion; 
• Irregular expenditure has risen to R28.3-billion; 
• Fruitless and wasteful expenditure has risen to almost R1.8-billion; and  
• Provincial departments account for 73% of irregular expenditure and 55% of fruitless and 
wasteful expenditure. 289 
 
Audited figures clearly reveal a constant, year-on-year increase in government 
misspending and the questionable use of public funds. Dhai290 is further critical of the 
State’s response to human rights issues, including a lack of access to health care. She is 
vociferous in her claim that – 
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“Instead of a progressive realisation of socio-economic rights, the experience has been a progressive 
infringement of these rights, as evidenced by the progressive deterioration of most services. The 
trajectory in the evolution of our democracy is somewhat regressive rather than forward moving when 
viewed through the lenses of socio-economic rights. No doubt the state has the resources to provide 
better services, but our democracy fails to do so because it is plagued with inefficiencies, incompetent 
management, corruption and lack of accountability.”291 
 
The HIV/AIDS crisis, no doubt, presents society with a complex set of problems that 
necessitates an integrated and holistic response. To be effective, the state response is 
required to incorporate afore-mentioned minimum core obligations, in accordance with 
international guidelines, in order to address an array of issues, including – 
• the prevention of HIV transmission; 
• adequate and effective treatment of HIV-positive individuals; 
• discrimination and abuse of HIV-affected individuals; and 
• infection epidemiology.292 
Following a holistic approach, in the context of HIV/AIDS, what is required inter alia, 
is access to primary health care services, to information about HIV, to voluntary testing 
and counselling facilities and to provision of ART and medication to treat 
opportunistic infections.293 But essential to this process is the monitoring of progress in 
the realisation, or the violation of human rights, on the assumption that “what gets 
measured gets done.”294  
 
To this end, it is vital to the enforcement of the right to health that national monitoring 
and accountability mechanisms are put in place to assess the extent to which the 
government complies with its obligations in relation to the right to health. Misspending 
and maladministration such as that recorded above must be confronted and addressed. 
Complaint procedures and public participation through NGOs are important tools to 
arrive at an independent impact assessment. Moreover, incorporation of international 
rules on the right to health into national law greatly contributes to the justiciability and 
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thereby enforcement of the right to health.295 Mechanisms are varied, but at a minimum, 
all accountability mechanisms must be accessible, transparent and effective, and 
include– 
• Judicial mechanisms 
• Administrative, policy and political mechanisms 
• National human rights institutions 
 
4.1.1 Judicial mechanisms: 
 
The South African experience reflects various landmark cases whereby the court 
exercised judicial power in order to enforce State compliance with policy; and while 
the intervention of the court is lauded, criticism has been levelled against the 
implementation and actual enforcement of the said court orders for not being as 
effective as the constitutional mandate requires the judiciary to be.296 
 
4.1.1.1 The Constitutional Court’s approach to a minimum core content to the 
 rights at issue: 
 
It is submitted that the court in Soobramoney297 applied a very ‘thin’298 standard of 
review. For, while the court may be commended for acknowledging that “there is a 
high level of unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have access 
to clean water or to adequate health services” and that “for as long as these conditions 
continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring”299, the court disappointingly 
went on to hold that “a court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in 
good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to 
deal with such matters.”300 
 
 Soobramoney was the first Constitutional Court case that dealt with a socio-economic 
rights issue; and a visionary, socially relevant and precedent-setting judgment was 
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expected from the court – one that gave clarity to the interpretation and content of such 
rights, particularly the right to access health care in this case. Instead, the decision 
demonstrates an undue deference to the legislature.301 One is forced to question the 
wisdom of the court in assuming that decisions taken by the legislature and other role 
players would necessarily be taken in ‘good faith’, and dismissing the need to 
interrogate such decisions as to its reasonableness within the social context.  
 
It is significant that the court in Soobramoney failed to acknowledge the possibility of 
according a minimum core content to the right to access health care, given the court’s 
apparent support for the importance of a transformative approach to the interpretation 
of socio-economic rights. The court was further remiss in its failure to refer to 
International law, in this regard, in its judgment. 
 
Although the court in Grootboom302 opted against the adoption of a minimum core 
content to the socio-economic right in question, it is respected for considering the 
arguments of the amici curiae and international law in this regard, before rejecting the 
concept. Having reflected on the provisions of the ICESCR, and the explanatory 
comments developed by the UN-CESCR for the interpretation thereof, the court 
reasoned that it was not placed, within the circumstances and facts of the case, to 
determine the relevant minimum core obligations to the right in question.303 
  
The court, per Yacoob J, indicated that – 
 
“Although evidence in a particular case may show that there is a minimum core of a particular service 
that should be taken into account in determining whether measures adopted by the state are reasonable, 
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the socio-economic rights of the Constitution should not be construed as entitling everyone to demand 
that the minimum core be provided to them.”304   
 
The minimum core was deemed as “possibly being relevant to reasonableness under 
section 26(2), and not as a self-standing right conferred on everyone under section 
26(1).”305 
 
In the TAC case, 306 following the jurisprudence in Grootboom, the court opted for the 
reasonableness standard of review as well. The court acknowledged the severity of the 
HIV/AIDS crisis in South; and confirmed that government action must be transparent, 
and the involvement of civil society mandatory in order for policies and programmes to 
be considered reasonable. 
 
Swart307 commends the court’s approach in protecting and advancing the pivotal role 
played by the judiciary in assessing health policy and in supervising and censuring 
government inaction. However, she berates the court for not using this platform to 
provide guidance as to the basic entitlements of the right to health. She is also critical 
of the court deeming the governmental obligation in this case as a negative one to 
refrain from interfering with the right, rather than a positive one to provide health care.  
 
In the TAC case, the Constitutional Court accommodated the arguments presented by 
the first and second amici curiae to the court’s proceedings.  The amici contended that 
section 27(1) of the Constitution established an individual right vested in everyone, 
that has a minimum core to which every person in need is entitled.  The amici further 
clarified the concept of “minimum core” that was consistent with the definition 
accorded thereto by the UN-CESCR in General Comment 3.308 
 
The court held that “it should be borne in mind that in dealing with such matters the 
courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and political 
enquiries necessary for determining what the minimum-core standards called for by the 
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first and second amici should be, nor for deciding how public revenues should most 
effectively be spent.”309 It noted that “there are many pressing demands on the public 
purse.”310  
 
The court held further that “courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court 
orders could have multiple social and economic consequences for the community”;311 
that the Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the courts, 
namely, to require the state to take measures to meet its constitutional obligations and 
to subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation.  Such determinations of 
reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves 
directed at rearranging budgets.  In this way the judicial, legislative and executive 
functions achieve appropriate constitutional balance.”312 
 
 4.1.1.2  Is an amended judicial approach required? 
 
It is respectfully submitted that the Constitutional Court’s approach has thus far, fallen 
far short of the requirements of transformative adjudication, primarily by rejecting a 
minimum core content to socio-economic rights, and by failing the poor and indigent 
that have approached it for recourse. 
 
Stewart contends that by merely focusing on an assessment of reasonableness in 
respect of government measures, the court defeats the aim of a purposive constitutional 
interpretation required by the Preamble313 and Section 39 of the Constitution, which 
requires the court, when interpreting a fundamental right “to promote the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.” The court is required to consider international law and may also consider 
foreign law.314 
 
While one may concede that the reasonableness review addresses concerns in respect 
of the separation of powers; the counter majoritarianism debate and judicial 
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competence, a deemed disadvantage of the reasonableness model of review is that 
there is no differentiation between defining the scope and meaning of the right, and the 
justification for possible infringements of the right. As such, the court fails to conduct 
an analysis of the underlying purpose of the right – and the violation of a socio-
economic right in particular, inevitably impacts on the lives of those materially 
deprived of basic human entitlements. The court consequently negates to give attention 
to the actual impact of such action on the social reality and the lives of many. The 
assessment whether measures adopted by the state are reasonable thus occurs in a 
‘normative vacuum.’315 Without this specification of standards to be met, government 
action, or inaction, cannot be measured. 
 
According to Currie,316 reasonableness is no more than a relational standard whereby 
ends are measured against needs – it is not an obligation to provide something specific. 
It thus reduces the value of socio-economic right entitlements, for example, the right to 
access to ARVs becomes a right to an evaluation of reasonableness.  
 
The control test, at the end of the day, involves asking: “In terms of the current 
approach of the courts, what does the right of access to health care actually mean and 
provide for?” We have no clear answer to this question in terms of current 
jurisprudence.  
 
Further, it is apparent that by using the reasonableness model of review, the court is 
seen as disguising inaction under the cover of the progressive realisation of rights. 
Twenty years into our democratic era, millions of South Africans are bound to question 
what time–frame should be ascribed to such progressive realisation of rights – for, by 
no means can the government continue to claim this indulgence indefinitely, and 
especially not without providing for basic human rights entitlements in the interim. The 
court in Grootboom endorsed the definition accorded to progressive realisation by the 
CESCR in General Comment 3, which provides that it is the full realisation of the right 
that must be achieved progressively – implying that a minimum level of basic 
entitlements that must be met immediately.317  
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It is submitted that all states are bound to experience resource constraints and 
challenges. However, this should not be a debilitating factor that impacts so severely 
on the indigent and vulnerable primarily. It would seem that these individuals are made 
to sacrifice the most, without an expectation of an improvement in their standard of 
living. Government is required to resort to innovative policy-making and to commit to 
the judicious and prudent use of resources; and this may only be achieved if the state is 
held to temporal performance guidelines, and made to account for its allocation of 
reserves. 
 
Pillay notes that the decision of the Constitutional Court in the Grootboom318 may be 
regarded as a significant victory for the displaced and homeless people of South 
Africa. 319 However, she believes that while the judgment may be seen as a momentous 
constitutional achievement in respect of the development of socio-economic rights, the 
judgment has failed to live up to the expectations of the litigants. A key problem, Pillay 
suggests, lies in the nature of the orders handed down by the Constitutional Court.  
 
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court handed down two orders. The first essentially 
made a settlement agreement between the parties an order of court, and was 
implemented to a limited extent. The Court handed down a second general order 
declaring that the State is obliged “to devise and implement within its available 
resources a comprehensive and coordinated programme progressively to realise the 
right of access to adequate housing”.320 This order was merely a declaratory order and 
did not compel the State to take steps to ensure that its programme complies with the 
court order.321 A further problem therewith, is that the order did not contain any time 
frames within which the State had to act. The result is that after the Grootboom 
judgment was handed down; there had been little tangible or visible change in housing 
policy so as to cater for people who find themselves in desperate and crisis 
situations.322 
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In respect of both orders, the Constitutional Court elected neither to play a supervisory 
role nor to oversee the implementation of the orders. This clearly has social and 
economic repercussions for indigent communities left bereft in the event of State non-
compliance, as new court proceedings have to be instituted to compel such 
performance. 
 
Swart 323 believes that there is reason to be critical of the relief granted in the 
Constitutional Court's socio-economic jurisprudence. Referring to the decisions in both 
the Grootboom324 and TAC cases,325 which resulted in ineffectual compliance with the 
awards in the judgments, she is extremely critical of the State’s inaction. 
 
It is noted that there exists potential on the part of the courts to move from ordering the 
“soft” remedy of a declarator to the “hard” remedy of a structural interdict. This was 
evident from the so-called “Westville prisoners” case326, where the eminent Justice 
Pillay ruled that the Respondent (the government) was not complying with its 
constitutional obligation to provide adequate medical treatment to prisoners. He issued 
an order directing the government to provide ARV treatment as well as a “supervisory 
order”. The supervising order necessitated a reporting and supervisory process, which 
was judicially monitored.327  
 
While the government appealed this judgment, and subsequently failed to comply with 
the court order, the Appeal Court, per Justice Nicholson, chastised such conduct by the 
State, in holding – 
 
“If the refusal to comply does not result from instructions from the first respondent, the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa, then the remaining respondents must be disciplined, either 
administratively or in an employment context, for their delinquency. If the Government of the Republic 
of South Africa has given such an instruction then we face a grave constitutional crisis involving a 
serious threat to the doctrine of the separation of powers. Should that continue the members of the 
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judiciary will have to consider whether their oath of office requires them to continue on the bench.” 
 
It is thus suggested that the Constitutional Court should be concerned with remedies 
that assist in realising socio-economic rights, such as the right to health and therefore 
primarily with “affirmative remedies including declarations, damages, reading-in, 
mandatory interdicts and structural interdicts.”328 Of these, constitutional damages and 
structural interdicts are recommended as “particularly suitable as remedies that would 
increase government accountability.”329  
 
When evaluating state action or inaction, the judiciary will have to assess whether, 
given the state's wide range of health commitments, special emphasis should be placed 
on the provision of ART and access to health care for HIV-positive individuals. It is 
submitted that the above minimum core obligations to the right to health, especially to 
access medicines, renders it a basic “floor” level entitlement that is non-derogable.330 
Ascribing the minimum content of the right to health thereby places the onus of 
proving incapacity on the State and not the individual. 
 
If a State is unable to fully comply with the right, particularly the minimum core 
obligations the right includes, it has to show it has taken all necessary measures and 
used all its available resources to try to comply. The minimum core obligations 
nevertheless have immediate effect. General Comment 14 provides that the limitation 
clause found in Article 4 of the ICESCR is intended to protect individuals rather than 
justify limitations. 
 
4.1.2 Administrative mechanisms, policy and political mechanisms: 
 
4.1.2.1 Constitutional administrative justice rights: 
 
Administrative justice rights have also constituted an important vehicle for protecting 
socio-economic rights.331 Responsiveness to people’s needs, public participation in 
                                                
328 Swart (see note 307 above) 218; Gloppen (see note 57 above) 13. 
329 Swart (see note 307 above) 219; Pieterse (see note 43 above) 248. 
330 Pieterse (see note 94 above) 481. 
331 Liebenberg (see note 3 above) 133. 
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policy-making and transparency are among the basic values and principles governing 
public administration in terms of Section 195 (e) and (g) of the Constitution. 
 
One of the advantages of the minimum core is that it places a weighty burden of 
justification on the state in cases where people are deprived of their basic needs. This 
promotes social and economic policies which are responsive to people’s needs, and 
accords with the requirements of Section 195 (1)(e) of the Constitution, which provides 
that the key principle regarding public administration in South Africa is that people’s 
needs must be responded to and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-
making. 
 
The institution of the Colombian tutela-like court processes, for example, would prove 
highly beneficial to disenfranchised individuals. It would provide such aggrieved 
persons with an urgent action for immediate relief. As such, access to justice shall be 
facilitated, and constitutional norms met. Further, with stringent time-based 
performance restrictions, and possible imprisonment and/or cost orders against 
defaulting public officials, constitutional rights face a better prospect of being realised. 
Iniquitous State spending may also be monitored and restrained. This is especially so if 
minimum levels of government obligations are safeguarded and enforced. 
 
Important in the context of the interpretation and implementation of health rights, are 
the following provisions, which have a bearing on the concerns raised by critics in 
respect of the separation of powers doctrine  – 
• Section 41 332  of the Constitution provides, inter alia, for the effective, 
transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole; 
respect for the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of 
government in the other spheres; co-operate with one another in mutual trust 
and good faith; and co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another.  
• Section 85 regulates the executive authority of the country and the development 
and implementation of national legislation and national policy. 
• Section 165 vests judicial authority in the courts, which are deemed 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law that they must 
                                                
332 Section 41: Principles of co-operative government and inter-governmental relations 
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apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.333 
 
4.1.2.2 National Policy – the National Strategic Plan (NSP): 
 
Further to the Constitutional, legal and humanitarian obligations placed on government 
to respond to the AIDS crisis, South African has implemented the National Strategic 
Plan (NSP) for HIV, Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) and Tuberculosis (TB) as 
a framework to guide policies and programmes in respect of HIV, STIs and TB in 
South Africa.334 The current plan provides goals and strategies for the country’s 
response to these diseases during the period 2012 to 2016.  
 
The NSP has five goals, as listed in the Plan335 – 
• halving the number of new HIV infections; 
• ensuring that at least 80% of people who are eligible for treatment for HIV are 
receiving it; 
• halving the number of new TB infections and deaths from TB; 
• ensuring that the rights of people living with HIV are protected; and 
• halving the stigma related to HIV and TB.  
 
The NSP has identified a number of strategic objectives that will help South Africa 
reach these goals.336 These are:  
 
• Address social and structural factors that drive these epidemics, influence their 
impact, and affect the way affected people are cared for. 
• Prevent new HIV, STIs and TB infections through a combination of 
interventions. 
                                                
333 Specifically with reference to constitutional adjudication, Section 172 provides for the following – 
Powers of courts in constitutional matters 
1. When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court - 
 a. must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid 
  to the extent of its inconsistency; and 
 b.  may make any order that is just and equitable, including - 
  i.  an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
  ii. an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, 
  to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.  
334 The National Strategic Plan (NSP) for HIV, Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) and Tuberculosis 
(TB) (2012-2016); available at http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/stratdocs/2012/NSPfull.pdf. 




• Protect the human rights of people living with HIV and improve their access to 
justice. 
• Sustain health and wellness, primarily by reducing deaths and disability from 
HIV, AIDS and TB. 
 
It clear that the NSP engages with the needs of HIV-positive individuals. It is 
submitted however, that the success or failure of such laudable plans lies in the extent 
to which they are enforceable. High infection rates, inaccess to medicines and 
misspending of public funding suggest that there still remains much work to be done. 
 
4.1.2.3 National Health Insurance: 
 
The Ministerial Advisory Committee on National Health Insurance (NHI)337 was 
established by the Department of Health in 2009. 338 The Minister of Health released 
the NHI Policy Paper in August 2011.339 The NHI is expected to provide all South 
Africans “access to appropriate, efficient and quality health services and affordable, 
quality health care, regardless of socio-economic status”.340 Masanque postulates that 
the NHI might be “South Africa’s single most important step towards fully realising 
socio-economic rights”. 341 It will extend health care coverage to the entire population 
over the next fourteen years,342 and is hoped to address the inequity inherent in national 
health as a result of the two-tier health care system.343 In this way, it is suggested that 
the NHI meets the obligations of access to health care, imposed by the minimum core.  
 
Successful implementation of the NHI depends on the concerted effort of the 
Department of Health and all role-players involved, the efficient allocation of 
resources and the monitoring and review of efficacy. 
                                                
337Department of Health. Policy on National Health Insurance. National Health Act No. 61 of 2003, 
Section 3; Number 657: 12 Aug 2011; available at http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/ 
notices/2011/not34523.pdf. 
338 “Statement on the Appointment of a Ministerial Advisory Committee on the National Health Insurance”  
issued by the Ministry of Health on 05/11/2009, available at http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/pr/2009/pr1105.html. 
339 G Ogunbanjo ‘National Health Insurance:  The “Shosholoza” train is already on the move!’ South 
African Family Practice (2011) Vol 53 No. 5 399. 
340 NHI (see note 327 above) at paragraph 1.2. 
341 IR Masanque ‘Progressive Realisation Without the ICESCR: The Viability of South Africa’s Socio-
Economic Rights Framework, and its Success in the Right to Access Health Care’ 43 California Western 
International Law Journal 461 2012-2013 481. 
342 NHI (see note 337 above) at paragraph 1.1 




4.1.3 National human rights institutions: 
Chapter 9 of the Constitution provides a further mechanism for public accountability 
and protection by creating State institutions supporting constitutional democracy. 
These include the Public Protector 344  and the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC).345 It is submitted that the utility of these offices in the 
enforcement and over-seeing of state action may be further exploited than it has been 
in the past.   
 
Section 184 (3) of the Constitution specifically mandates the SAHRC to monitor the 
implementation of economic and social rights by the relevant organs of the state. 
Pursuant hereto, the Commission compiles periodical reports, which analyse South 
Africa’s progress in respect of the MDGs and the progressive realisation of socio-
economic rights. In terms of the latest publication in 2009,346 the following disturbing 
findings were made – 
• “There is inconsistency in data gathering on health issues, and the consequent unreliable 
statistics and lack of disaggregation of certain indicators make it difficult to measure the 
progressive realisation of the right to health care services.  
•  South Africa is not even close to halfway on meeting the target for the child mortality rate, 
after nine years of commitment to the MDG and with only six more years to go.  
•  South Africa is a far way from reaching the target of reducing the maternal mortality rate by 
three quarters. In fact the trend is suggesting that it is increasing.  
• New patients living with and affected by HIV/AIDS find it difficult to access ARV 
programmes due to a lack of additional resources, and therefore their right to adequate health 
care is compromised.  
• Access to health care services for the poor is severely constrained by expensive, inadequate or 
nonexistent transport, by serious shortages with regards to emergency transport, and by long 
waiting times at clinics and other health care facilities.  
• There is insufficient access to health care for vulnerable groups such as women, sex workers, 
prisoners and older persons.” 
 
Clearly, there is a dire need to monitor, address and, if necessary, to sanction, 
government inaction. Undoubtedly, this will be greatly facilitated by enforcing a 
                                                
344 Section 182. 
345 Section 184. 
346 SAHRC 7th Report on Socio-Economic Rights (2006-2009). 
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minimum core obligation on the State. 
 
4.2 South African ratification of the ICESCR and implementation in national 
 law: 
 
Ratification of the ICESCR and thereafter signing the OP-ICESCR (the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR) will hold South Africa accountable in terms of the reporting 
mechanism of the OP-ICESCR. Until recently, the rights outlined in the ICESCR did 
not have an individual complaints system, and it was believed that “the absence of 
strong enforcement mechanisms in the ICESCR has marginalised economic, social and 
cultural rights and stymied their full realisation.”347 
 
On 10 December 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted an individual complaints 
mechanism for violations of socio-economic rights. As such, any country that has 
ratified the ICESCR, and signs onto the Optional-Protocol to the ICESCR may be 
answerable to the CESCR for violations of the ICESCR. 
 
Brennan reports that the OP-ICESCR may be considered a “milestone which will mark 
a high point of the gradual trend towards greater recognition of the indivisibility and 
interrelatedness of all human rights; greater accountability and transparency; and more 
judicious use of resources.”348 Signatory states may be forced to review policies and 
actions more stringently for fear of such a mechanism of answerability.349 
 
4.3 Minimum core obligations of the private sector – horizontal application of 
 the Bill of Rights in order to supplement available resources: 
 
Respect for the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights by juristic persons is required by 
section 8(2) of the Constitution (the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights).350 
                                                
347 M Brennan ‘To Adjudicate and Enforce Socio-Economic Rights: South Africa Proves That Domestic 
Courts are a Viable Option’ 9 Queensland University of Technology Law & Justice Journal 64 2009 68; 
MJ Dennis and DP Stewart ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Should there be an 
International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing and Health?’ 
(2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 462: 463.  
348 Brennan (see note 347 above) 68. 
349 Ibid 69. 
350 Section 8(2) provides - A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to 
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Such an application of the minimum core obligations of the right to health would mean 
that the private sector – individuals, corporations and business entities, may also be 
obligated to meet the requirements of the minimum core.  
 
In this respect, the private sector, and ‘big business’ in particular can contribute 
significantly to the fight against HIV/AIDS in terms of financial contributions, 
resource allocation and communal involvement and support. It is submitted that at a 
time when international aid may be declining, and domestic avenues are constrained, 
especially as HIV/AIDS impacts on the interests of such businesses as well, it would 
be mutually beneficial for such concerns to invest in resolving the crisis. 
 
While it may be accepted that the pharmaceutical industry undeniably contributes to 
the fight against HIV/AIDS, one may argue that it simultaneously thwarts access to 
treatment by their patents. 351 De Jongh suggests that measures to redress this lies in 
improving access to medicines by, for example, providing medicine in remote areas 
and an improved pricing policy. 352  Moreover the industry should ensure good quality 
and availability of the medicines, especially certain 2nd and 3rd line ARV treatments. 
Pharmaceutical companies are also well-placed to contribute financially toward the 













                                                                                                                                        
the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty 
imposed by the right. 
351 de Jongh (see note 14 above) 135. 







This dissertation involved an evaluation of the concept of a minimum core content to 
the Constitutional right to health with reference to HIV-positive persons in South 
Africa, and whether South African jurisprudence allows for such a concept. The 
assessment has sought to establish what this concept entails, whether such a 
construction is necessary in the South African context, how it may be enforced, as well 
a legal basis for same – either in National or International law. 
 
An appraisal of the South African social reality has revealed the extent of the suffering 
of HIV-positive individuals and the difficulties experienced in accessing basic health 
care. It has been established that a key debilitating factor is the uncertainty that 
surrounds the basic entitlements of affected people. There is thus a fundamental need 
to move away from perceived judicial insouciance that allows such vagueness to fester, 
and develop an approach that is meaningful to the lives of the indigent in our country.  
 
The first step is to develop a construction of human rights that accords with the canons 
of the Constitution. This mandates an interpretation of human rights that fosters 
transformative constitutionalism in order to heal our society of past injustice and 
secure a better future for all. 
 
One such course of action is the adoption of the minimum core, which prescribes a 
basic level of human rights that is guaranteed to all people – and which may withstand 
legislative challenge on the basis of resource constraints or progressive realisation. 
 
Implementing a core content to the right to health, in turn, requires adjudication that 
legitimises the minimum core credo and develops our jurisprudence so as to give form 
and substance to the concept in light of our own peculiar social context. Reference to 
International law assists us to overcome the shortcoming in domestic legislation in this 
regard. Of particular relevance is covenantal guidance offered by the ICESCR, and its 





The aforementioned instruments advocate the following minimum obligations in 
respect of the right to health –  
• a system of health protection providing equality of opportunity for everyone to 
enjoy the highest attainable level of health;  
• prevention, treatment and control of diseases;  
• access to essential medicines; 
• emergency medical treatment  
• maternal, child and reproductive health;  
• equal and timely access to basic health services;  
• the provision of health-related education and information; and 
• participation of the population in health-related decision-making at the national 
and community levels. 
 
It has thus been postulated that a minimum obligation to HIV-positive individuals 
under the right to health encompasses the duty of treatment and prevention and control 
in respect of the epidemic, on a non-discriminatory basis. 
 
The core content having been identified, enforcement and implementation of such 
health rights must be strictly and timeously effected. Of crucial importance in such a 
process is a competent judiciary that is able to resist an undue deference to the 
legislature.  
 
A review of court judgments, however, reveals a less than satisfactory execution of the 
constitutional mandate in this regard. A call is thus made for progressive judicialism, 
or judicial activism, within prescribed Constitutional parameters, so as to safeguard 
Constitutional guarantees and enforce their realisation. Perhaps, what is sought is a 
return to the ‘golden era’ of Makwanyane when the Constitutional Court committed 
itself to an interpretation of the Bill of Rights that accorded with Constitutional values, 
such as uBuntu, rather than bend to the strong will of political expediency. 
 
It is proposed that this process may thus entail – 
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• judicial supervision of administrative function by structural interdicts and 
supervisory orders; 
• punitive cost orders against those in default; and 
• an adjudicative process that is accessible and effective, especially to the 
indigent and sick. 
 
Guidance from International cohorts in this respect is instructive. Uganda demonstrates 
that legal incorporation of the minimum core in domestic legislation is possible and the 
success of grass-roots implementation of HIV/AIDS policy. Colombia provides us with 
insight as to the accomplishments that may be made by recognising the minimum core 
and progressive judicial action, that is accessible and relevant for millions of people. 
 
It is submitted that a failure to acknowledge the basic human entitlements of the poor, 
sick and marginalised in South African, is a miscarriage of justice that we can ill-
afford. We cannot subsist in a society devoid of a moral compass or a social 
conscience, that permits the suffering of an entire people. The minimum core allows 
rights to have pervasive and beneficial value, and restores the dignity of our country. It 
draws mandatory attention to plight of the sick, and the hard truth of HIV/AIDS, 
poverty and poor governance. 
 
It is time for the axiom “ubi jus ibi remedium” (where there is a right there is a 
remedy),353 to have literal meaning in the context of health care, and in respect of HIV-









                                                
353 http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/ubi-jus-ibi-remedium/; the maxim contemplates that “when a person's 
right is violated the victim will have an equitable remedy under law.” The maxim also states “the person 
whose right is being infringed has a right to enforce the infringed right through any action before a court.” 
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APPENDIX: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
The list hereunder describes in full the various acronyms and abbreviations that appear 
in this dissertation – 
 
ACP  AIDS Control Program (Uganda) 
AIDS  Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
ART  Anti-retroviral Treatment 
ARV  Anti-retroviral 
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All types of Discrimination Against 
  Women (UN) 
CRC  Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN) 
CSO  Civil Society Organisation (Uganda) 
HIV  Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
ICESCR International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN) 
MDG  Millennium Development Goal (UN) 
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation 
NHI  National Health Insurance 
NSP  National Strategic Plan for HIV, Sexually Transmitted Infections   
  and Tuberculosis 
OAU  Organisation of African Unity 
OP-ICESCR Optional Protocol to the International Convention on Economic, Social 
  and Cultural Rights (UN) 
PEAP  Poverty Eradication Action Plan (Uganda) 
PEPFAR President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (USA) 
PHM  People’s Health Movement 
PMTCT Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (of HIV) 
PrEP  Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis 
SADC  Southern Africa Development Community 
SAHRC South African Human Rights Commission 
STI  Sexually Transmitted Infection 
TAC  Treatment Action Campaign 
TasP  Treatment as Prevention Strategy 
TB  Tuberculosis 
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UN-ICESCR United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
UN  United Nations 
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